. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you,
the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

     . No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

     . It should follow then, that, according to you, real
sounds may possibly be <seen or felt>, but never .

     . Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a
jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things.
I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something
oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the
use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions
adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the
way.

     . Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself
to have gained no small point, since you make so light of
departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part
of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the {183}
common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the
world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical
paradox, to say that <real sounds are never heard>, and that the
idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there
nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

     . To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the
concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too
have no real being without the mind.

     . And I hope you will make no difficulty to
acknowledge the same of .

     . Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?

     . The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal
Substances existing without the mind?

     . They are.

     . And have true and real colours inhering in them?

     . Each visible object hath that colour which we see in
it.

     . How! is there anything visible but what we perceive
by sight?

     . There is not.

     . And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do
not perceive immediately?

     . How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing?
I tell you, we do not.

     . Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more,
whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses,
except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but
I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same
opinion.

     . I do.

     . Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

     . What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

     . My reason for asking was, because in saying, <each
visible object hath that colour which we see in it>, you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either
that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that
there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight:
but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still
maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your
<corporeal substance> is nothing distinct from <sensible
qualities>. {184}

     . You may draw as many absurd consequences as you
please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you
shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my
own meaning.

     . I wish you would make me understand it too. But,
since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal
substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be
pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see
exist in external bodies, or some other.

     . The very same.

     . What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see
on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in
themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?

     . I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really
in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only