27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being- as it perceives
ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or
otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Hence there can
be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being
passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by
way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will
make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like
that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely
impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that
it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it
produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here
delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any
power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal
powers, marked by the names will and understanding, distinct from each
other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general,
with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the
aforesaid powers- which is signified by the name soul or spirit.
This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words will,
soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for
any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas,
and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any
idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have
some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as
willing, loving, hating- inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning
of these words.

  28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and
shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and
straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same
power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and
unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active.
Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we think
of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we
only amuse ourselves with words.

  29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find
the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my
will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power
to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular
objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the
hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not
creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit
that produces them.

  30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than
those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order,
and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the
effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series,
the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom
and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established
methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of
sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by
experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended
with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.

  31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate
our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be
eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that
might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of
sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that
to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in
general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are
conducive- all this we know, not by discovering any necessary
connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the
settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in
uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to
manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.

  32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently
displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will
constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to
Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For,
when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other
ideas and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute
power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of
another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible.
Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a
certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch
the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the
sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the
motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are
inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

  33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are
called real things; and those excited in the imagination being less
regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or
images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our
sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless
ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as
truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are
allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong,
orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no
argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less
dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them,
in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful
spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether faint
or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

  34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time
in answering objections which may probably be made against the