moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the
schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of
Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are
nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine
conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

  47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we
allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will
unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally
admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none
of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident from
sect. II and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers
contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of
those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses
are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it
must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now
universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable
philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all
exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of parts in
each particle of Matter which are not perceived by sense. The reason
therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite
magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not
because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite
number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to
discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more
acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that
is, the object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts
in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to
bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an
obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape,
when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem
infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body, but
only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in itself, is
infinitely extended, and consequently void of all shape or figure.
From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of
Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the
materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to
acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense,
nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and
each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless,
and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which
compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer
than it is perceived.

  48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not
be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so
as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For,
though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but
ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude
they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us,
since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we
do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the
mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular
mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from
the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every
moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our
perception of them.

  49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure
exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and
figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with
the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I
answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived
by it- that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of
idea; and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because
extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue,
because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it,
and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of subject and mode,
that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this
proposition "a die is hard, extended, and square," they will have it
that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the
hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in
which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be
nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or
accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to
attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting
them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die.

  50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things
explained by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the
whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical
principles which have been applied with so much success to account for
the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by
ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all
proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or Matter doth
really exist. To this I answer that there is not any one phenomenon
explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained
without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction of
particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon
such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But
how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is
what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident
there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they who
attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by
figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than
mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as hath
been already shewn. See sect. 25.

  51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not
seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the