expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we
may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd
as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I
imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important
questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the
nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an
idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to
have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and
its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant
by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not
say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the
world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety
that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is
also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the
mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a
notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the
modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and
acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.

  143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract
ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and
obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things.
Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers
and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the
mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects.
Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand
for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and
morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes
amongst the learned.

  144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging
men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and
operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things
in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed
the motion of the soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man
is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of
sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence
arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in
morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear
plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on
to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.

  145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the
existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or
the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions,
changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain
particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in
their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is
not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the
intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct
from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.

  146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents
are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that
those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far
greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not
produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore
some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they
should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively
consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of
natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of
the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of
creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the
whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and
pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and
passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the
same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One,
Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive
that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all,"
and "by whom all things consist."

  147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and
immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from
ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more
evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects
of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those
ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a
man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince
the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is
evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other
object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that
such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of
another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is
who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that
intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the
existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which
enlightens every one is itself invisible.

  148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that
they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a
man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands.
But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of
all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of
our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have
it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by
themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of
God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. But
I shall explain my meaning;- A human spirit or person is not perceived
by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour,
size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain