supposition- that the making use of words implies the having general
ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to
abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing
of the author will further appear by his answering the question he
in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only
particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words
become general by being made the signs of general ideas."- Essay on
Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes
general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but
of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently
suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of
motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever
has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood
of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not
follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a
body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I
must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is
neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black,
white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only
implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be
swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever
object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the
other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line,
surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.

  12. By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge
how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny
absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any
abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein
there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are
formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9.
Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what
we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which,
considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made
to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is
demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He
draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in
itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its
signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all
particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is
demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general.
And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign,
so the name "line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a
sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its
being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular
right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought
to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various
particular lines which it indifferently denotes.

  13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of
abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall
add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV.
vii. 9) which is as follows: "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or
easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If
they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and
familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon
them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances
of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily
offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not
require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle
(which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and
difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at
once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an
idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas
are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need
of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the
conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both
which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to
suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is
enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not
those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such
as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."- If any man has the
faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here
described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor
would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and
certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And
this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform. What more
easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there
try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall
correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea
of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral,
equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?"

  14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry
with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them.
And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and
labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular
objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are
conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural
consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the
forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is
so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they
seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and
familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time
it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and
furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It
cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not
conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the