abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming;
from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such
things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought
of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human
Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have
contributed to the origin of that mistake.- First then, it is
thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and
settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain
abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only
immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the
mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify
any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one
precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they
all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All
which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and
will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will
be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby
restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is
defined to be "a plain surface comprehended by three right lines,"
by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other.
To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the
surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are
long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are
inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and
consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the
signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name
constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand
everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other
useless and impracticable.

  19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the
doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a
received opinion that language has no other end but the
communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an
idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which
yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out
particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they
stand for abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst
speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate,
particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will
deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary
(even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for
ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding
the ideas they are made to stand for- in reading and discoursing,
names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in
which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to
proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter
suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed
to stand for.

  20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the
chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are
other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or
deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular
disposition- to which the former is in many cases barely
subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be
obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the
familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with
himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or
reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred,
admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind
upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming
between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas
that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it
will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the
hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately
attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced
by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not,
for example, be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we
have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with
danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any
particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea
of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little
reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will
evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the
propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks
of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the
hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with
a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that
are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells
me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means by it is to
dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission
which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so
instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to
resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is
impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation
should go before. Innumerable examples of this kind may be given,
but why should I insist on those things which every one's experience
will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?

  21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas.
We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest
patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to
which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to
the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be
language.- It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in
that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been
purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and
nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one
single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts