of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse
of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since
therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever
ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into
my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names
which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them; from
which I may expect to derive the following advantages:

  22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies
purely verbal- the springing up of which weeds in almost all the
sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound
knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself
out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has so
miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this
peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was
the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared
and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts
to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be
mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I
cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It
is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike
or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or
disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are
included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more
requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own
understanding.

  23. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an
entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly
promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so
early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words
and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased
by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract
ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that
they should use words for ideas- it being found an impracticable thing
to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which
in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the
principal cause why those men who have so emphatically recommended
to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations,
and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it
themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd
opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of
words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that
we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from
the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may
be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due
regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate
use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate
signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

  24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater
ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no
other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find
out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that
knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the
labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were,
therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost
endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider,
separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which
so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention.
In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the
entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned
men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity- we need only draw the
curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit
is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

  25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge
from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinite
reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from
consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only
lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled
in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the
following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his
own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in
reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy
for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out
of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he
can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised
ideas.
TREATISE

                              A TREATISE

                      CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES

                          OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

  1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of
human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on
the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions
and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of
memory and imagination- either compounding, dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By
sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several
degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and
cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either
as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the
palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all
their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are
observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one