argument for God's existence.5 Similarly, according to James
O'Higgins, Hume accepted the design argument, although remained
skeptical about the entire enterprise of reasoning. For
O'Higgins, Hume reluctantly conceded God's existence, yet, like
the Deists, denied that God concerns himself with governing the
world.6 J.C.A. Gaskin sees Hume as an attenuated deist insofar as
Hume held that there was a weak probability that natural order
resulted from an intelligence remotely analogous to our own. For
Gaskin, Hume maintains that this weak probability combines with
our more subjective human feeling that natural order springs from
a designer, hence we assent to the existence of a designer
(although this being has no moral claim on us). Norman Kemp Smith
argues that religion for Hume consists exclusively in an
intellectual assent to the proposition "God exists." Kemp Smith
concludes, though, that religion for Hume ought not to have any
influence on human conduct.7 Similarly, for B.A.O. Williams,
Hume's religion consisted of merely holding open the possibility
of an intelligent creator.8

     Ernest C. Mossner argues that Hume denied all supernatural
and conventional religion, but advanced a "religion of man"
insofar as Hume optimistically believed that the enlightened
determine the fate of humanity and are the measure of all
things.9 Similarly, Donald Livingston argues that Hume offers a
"philosophical theism" which is an historically determined
natural belief, yet one which eschews the writings and rituals of
the theistic tradition.10 It should be noted, however, that even
if Mossner and Livingston have captured Hume's views, it is
difficult to see how this could qualify as a religion by 18th
century standards, and it is hard to believe that Hume would want
to classify it as such. Finally, for James Noxon, Hume is simply
an agnostic (as opposed to an atheist):

     no one of the characters in the Dialogues... speaks

     consistently for Hume. Every attempt to identify Hume's

     spokesman could be forestalled by quoting lines given to

     that speaker which were inconsistent with statements

     published elsewhere under Hume's own name.11

Insofar as no one of the characters speaks consistently for Hume,
Noxon argues that this expresses Hume's view about the limits of
human understanding and, consequently, indicates that Hume is an
agnostic.

     Most of the above contemporary debate about Hume's views
traces back to three sources. First, in Hume's Natural History of
Religion, in no less than nine passages Hume seems to defend the
design argument for God's existence. Second, in several of Hume's
above quoted letters (to Gilbert Elliot and William Strahan) Hume
appears sympathetic to Cleanthes' position. Third, in the
concluding section of the Dialogues Hume seems to endorse the
design argument: Cleanthes, the defender of natural religion,
wins the debate, and Philo, the religious skeptic, eventually
concedes that "the cause or causes of order in the universe
probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence."
However, all three of these sources can be seen, and probably
should be seen, as instances of concealment. Although
contemporary commentators do note Hume's use of irony in his
writings, they have lost sight of how pervasive and complex it
is, especially with politically sensitive issues such as
religion. Early commentators had this well in view when they
interpreted Hume. They lived at the same time and under the same
political conditions as Hume did, and they were accustomed to the
decoding the concealed meaning in other nontraditional writers.
The principle value of Horne's farcical dialog between Tim and
Tom is that it shows the absurdity of seeing Philo as a champion
of religion, especially in the pivotal Part 12 of the Dialogues.
From Horne's perspective, contemporary commentators who take Part
12 as evidence for Hume's theism have fallen into Hume's trap.

                             * * * *

                                

                     PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS

     It has been remarked, my H/ERMIPPUS\, that though the
ancient philosophers conveyed most of their instruction in the
form of dialogue, this method of composition has been little
practised in later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of
those who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument,
indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical inquirers,
naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner;
where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point
at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to
deduce the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a
S/YSTEM\ in conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the
dialogue-writer desires, by departing from the direct style of
composition, to give a freer air to his performance, and avoid
the appearance of Author and Reader, he is apt to run into a
worse inconvenience, and convey the image of Pedagogue and Pupil.
Or, if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good
company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and preserving a
proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much time in
preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think
himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the