1748

                   AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

                                 by David Hume

           Sect. I. Of the different Species of Philosophy

  1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be
treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar
merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and
reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for
action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment;
pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value
which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in
which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed
to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the
most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence,
and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such
as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the
affections. They select the most striking observations and instances
from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast;
and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and
happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts
and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference
between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments;
and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true
honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their
labours.

  2. The other species of philosophers considers man in the light of a
reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavours to form his
understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human
nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine
it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our
understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any
particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to
all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond
controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and
should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty
and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these
distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are
deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular
instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to
principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at
those original principles, by which, in every science, all human
curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract,
and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation
of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently
compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can
discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction
of posterity.

  3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always,
with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate
and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more
agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into
common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those
principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them
nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the
contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind,
which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the
philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its
principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour.
The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the
vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce
the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

  4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as
justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that
abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary
reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have
not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity.
It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his
subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of
another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from
embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its
contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only
to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more
engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther;
but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of
the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any
dangerous illusions. The fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but
that of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas,
and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of Malebranche is
confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And Addison,
perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke shall be entirely
forgotten.

  The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little
acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing
either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives
remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in
principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the
other hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is
anything deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and
nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of
all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect
character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an
equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving