long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But
this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a
Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy
to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper,
and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines,
beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or
perfection. What we imagine to be a superior perfection, may really be
a defect. Or were it ever so much a perfection, the ascribing of it to
the Supreme Being, where it appears not to have been really exerted,
to the full, in his works, savours more of flattery and panegyric,
than of just reasoning and sound philosophy. All the philosophy,
therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but
a species of philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the
usual course of experience, or give us measures of conduct and
behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on
common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious
hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; no reward or punishment
expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by practice and
observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will still appear solid
and satisfactory; nor have the political interests of society any
connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and
religion.

  114. There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to
have overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your
conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings
can have no influence on life, because they ought to have no
influence; never considering, that men reason not in the same manner
you do, but draw many consequences from the belief of a divine
Existence, and suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on
vice, and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary
course of nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not,
is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduct must still be
the same. And, those, who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices,
may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to
be good citizens and politicians; since they free men from one
restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement of the laws
of society, in one respect, more easy and secure.

  After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in
favour of liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which
you endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate
every principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any
government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence.
There is no enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not
very alluring to the people; and no restraint can be put upon their
reasonings, but what must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences,
and even to the state, by paving the way for persecution and
oppression in points, where the generality of mankind are more
deeply interested and concerned.

  115. But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main
topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without
insisting on it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate
a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause
to be known only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or
to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel
and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen
under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are
found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the
other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular,
and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see
that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its
cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the
only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this
nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and
resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we
have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. I
leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this
principle. I shall just observe, that, as the antagonists of
Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and
unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and
unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem, at
least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how
we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from
our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any
addition to it.

                   Sect. XII. Of the academical or

                          sceptical Philosophy

                                PART I.

  116. There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings,
displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a
Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most
religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded
as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these
contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the
world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with
regard to the existence of these monsters.

  The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the
indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is
certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or
conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any
subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural
question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to
push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?