126. The sceptical objections to moral evidence, or to the
reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either popular or
philosophical. The popular objections are derived from the natural
weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions, which
have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of
our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity
and adversity; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's
opinions and sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is
needless to insist farther on this head. These objections are but
weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact
and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually
employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived
from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The
great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of
scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common
life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools;
where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But
as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real
objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in
opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they
vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same
condition as other mortals.

  127. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper
sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise from
more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of
triumph; while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter
of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is
derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we have
no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have
been frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to
convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been
frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be
conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this
inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it
is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may be
fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics,
he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; and
seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction.
These arguments might be displayed at greater length, if any durable
good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them.

  128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to
excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it;
while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a
sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these
curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to
answer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different
system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will
remain constant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean
displays principles, which may not be durable, but which have an
effect on conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect,
that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or
if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the
contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that
all human life must perish, were his principles universally and
steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately
cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of
nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is
true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always
too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or
others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound
reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to
flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every
point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every
other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any
philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be
the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that
all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other
tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act
and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of
these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised
against them.

                            PART III.

  129. There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical
philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in
part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism,
when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by
common sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally
apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they
see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising
argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles,
to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who
entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes
their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their
action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a
state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could
never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their
affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such
dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of
human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most
accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would
naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish
their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against
antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the
learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are