ever attempt to prove that thou wert a coward, for having preferred
death to a shameful existence.

     O the dignity and energy of your modern writers! How sublime,
how intrepid are you with your pens? but tell me, thou great and
valiant hero, who dost so courageously decline the battle, in order
to endure the pain of living somewhat longer; when spark of fire
{79} lights upon your hand, why do you withdraw it in such haste?
how? are you such a coward that you dare not bear the scorching of
fire? nothing, you say, can oblige you to endure the burning spark;
and what obliges me to endure life? was the creation of a man of
more difficulty to Providence, than that of a straw? and is not both
one and the other equally the work of his hands?

     Without doubt, it is an evidence of great fortitude to bear
with firmness the misery which we cannot shun; none but a fool,
however, will voluntarily endure evils which he can avoid without a
crime; and it is very often a great crime to suffer pain
unnecessarily. He who has not resolution to deliver himself from a
miserable being by a speedy death, is like one who would rather
suffer a wound to mortify, than trust to a surgeon's knife for his
cure. Come, thou worthy -- cut off this leg, which endangers my
life. I will see it done without shrinking, and will give that hero
leave to call me coward, who suffers his leg to mortify, because he
dares not undergo the same operation. {80}

     I acknowledge that there are duties owing to others, the nature
of which will not allow every man to dispose of his life; but, in
return, how many are there which give him a right to dispose of it?
let a magistrate on whom the welfare of a nation depends, let a
father of a family who is bound to procure subsistence for his
children, let a debtor who might ruin his creditors, let these at
all events discharge their duty; admitting a thousand other civil
and domestic relations to oblige an honest and unfortunate man to
support the misery of life, to avoid the greater evil of doing
injustice; is it, therefore, under circumstances totally different,
incumbent on us to preserve a life oppressed with a swarm of
miseries, when it can be of no service but to him who has not
courage to die? "Kill me, my child," says the decrepid savage to his
son, who carries him on his shoulders, and bends under his weight;
the "enemy is at hand; go to battle with thy brethren; go and
preserve thy children, and do not suffer thy helpless father to fall
{81} alive into the hands of those whose relations he has mangled."
Though hunger, sickness, and poverty, those domestic plagues, more
dreadful than savage enemies, may allow a wretched cripple to
consume, in a sick bed, the provisions of a family which can scarce
subsist itself, yet he who has no connections, whom heaven has
reduced to the necessity of living alone, whose wretched existence
can produce no good, why should not he, at least, have the right of
quitting a station, where his complaints are troublesome, and his
sufferings of no benefit?

     Weigh these considerations, my lord; collect these arguments,
and you will find that they may be reduced to the most simple of
nature's rights, of which no man of sense ever yet entertained a
doubt. In fact, why should we be allowed to cure ourselves of the
gout, and not to get rid of the misery of life? do not both evils
proceed from the same hand? to what purpose is it to say, that death
is painful? are drugs agreeable to be taken? no, nature revolts
against both. Let them prove therefore {82} that it is more
justifiable to cure a transient disorder by the application of
remedies, than to free ourselves from an incurable evil by putting
an end to our life; and let them shew how it can be less criminal to
use the bark for a fever, than to take opium for the stone. If we
consider the object in view, it is in both cases to free ourselves
from painful sensations; if we regard the means, both one and the
other are equally natural; if we consider the repugnance of our
nature, it operates equally on both sides; if we attend to the will
of providence, can we struggle against any evil of which it is not
the author can we deliver ourselves from any torment which the hand
of God has not inflicted? what are the bounds which limit his power,
and when resistance lawful? are we then to make no alteration in the
condition of things, because every thing is in the state he
appointed? must we do nothing in this life, for fear of infringing
his laws, or is it in our power to break them if we would? no, my
lord, the occupation of man is more great and noble. God did not
give him life that he should supinely {83} remain in a state of
constant inactivity. But he gave him freedom to act, conscience to
will, and reason to choose what is good. He has constituted him sole
judge of all his actions. He has engraved this precept in his heart,
Do whatever you conceive to be for your own good, provided you
thereby do no injury to others. If my sensations tell me that death
is eligible, I resist his orders by an obstinate resolution to live;
for, by making death desirable, he directs me to put an end to my
being.

     My lord, I appeal to your wisdom and candour; what more
infallible maxims can reason deduce from religion, with respect to
suicide? If Christians have adopted contrary tenets, they are
neither drawn from the principles of religion, nor from the only
sure guide, the Scriptures, but borrowed from the Pagan
philosophers. Lactantius and Augustine, the first who propagated
this new doctrine, of which Jesus Christ and his apostles take no
notice, ground their arguments entirely on the reasoning of Phaedo,
which I have already {84} controverted; so that the believers, who,
in this respect, think they are supported by the authority of the
Gospel, are in fact only countenanced by the authority of Plato. In
truth, where do we find, throughout the whole bible any law against
suicide, or so much as a bare disapprobation of it; and is it not
very unaccountable, that among the instances produced of persons who