with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the existence
of these attributes? -- 'Tis very safe for us to affirm, that
whatever we know the Deity to have actually done, is best; but 'tis
very dangerous to affirm, that he must always do {27} what to us
seems best. In how many instances would this reasoning fail us with
regard to the present world? -- But if any purpose of nature be
clear, we may affirm, that the whole scope and intention of man's
creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to
the present life. With how weak a concern from the original inherent
structure of the mind and passions, does he ever look farther? What
comparison either for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an
idea, and the most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact that
occurs in common life. There arise indeed in some minds some
unaccountable terrors with regard to futurity; but these would
quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and
education. And those who foster them, what is their motive? Only to
gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world.
Their very zeal and industry therefore is an argument against them.
{28}

     WHAT cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to
confine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the
present life, if there be another scene still waiting us, of
infinitely greater consequence? Ought this barbarous deceit to be
ascribed to a beneficent and wise being? -- Observe with what exact
proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are
adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him great
superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably
multiplied upon him; his whole time, his whole capacity, activity,
courage, and passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against
the miseries of his present condition, and frequently, nay almost
always are too slender for the business assigned them. -- A pair of
shoes perhaps was never yet wrought to the highest degree of
perfection which that commodity is capable of attaining. Yet it is
necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some
politicians and moralists, {29} even some geometers, poets, and
philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior
to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes
and hares are, compared to their wants and to their period of
existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious.
--

     ON the theory of the Soul's mortality, the inferiority of
women's capacity is easily accounted for. Their domestic life
requires no higher faculties, either of mind or body. This
circumstance vanishes and becomes absolutely insignificant, on the
religious theory: the one sex has an equal task to perform as the
other; their powers of reason and resolution ought also to have been
equal, and both of them infinitely greater than at present. As every
effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first
cause of all, which is the Deity; every thing that happens is
ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or
vengeance. -- By what rule are punishments {30} and rewards
distributed? What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? shall
we suppose that human sentiments have place in the Deity? How bold
that hypothesis. We have no conception of any other sentiments. --
According to human sentiments, sense, courage, good manners,
industry, prudence, genius, &c. are essential parts of personal
merits. Shall we therefore erect an elysium for poets and heroes
like that of the antient mythology? Why confine all rewards to one
species of virtue? Punishment, without any proper end or purpose, is
inconsistent with our ideas of goodness and justice, and no end
can be served by it after the whole scene is closed. Punishment,
according to our conception, should bear some proportion to the
offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of
so frail a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander's
rage, who intended to extirminate a whole nation because they had
seized his favorite horse Bucephalus?[6] {31}

     HEAVEN and Hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good
and the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and
virtue. -- Were one to go round the world with an intention of
giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound drubbing to the
wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would
find that the merits and the demerits of most men and women scarcely
amount to the value of either. -- To suppose measures of approbation
and blame different from the human confounds every thing. Whence do
we learn that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from
our own sentiments? -- What man who has not met with personal
provocation (or what good-natured man who has) could inflict on
crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the common, legal,
frivolous punishments? And does any thing steel the breast of judges
and juries against the sentiments of humanity but reflection on
necessity and public interest? {32} By the Roman law those who had
been guilty of parricide and confessed their crime, were put into a
sack alone with an ape, a dog, and a serpent, and thrown into the
river. Death alone was the punishment of those whose who denied
their guilt, however fully proved. A criminal was tried before
Augustus, and condemned after a full conviction, but the humane
emperor, when he put the last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as
to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. "You surely (said the
"prince) did not kill your father."[7] This lenity suits our natural
ideas of right even towards the greatest of all criminals, and
even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufference. Nay even the
most bigotted priest would naturally without reflection approve of
it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these
crimes hurt himself in his temporal interest and advantages,
perhaps he may not be altogether so {33} indulgent to them. The
chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interest of
human society. Ought these interests, so short, so frivolous, to be