He gives us the summary View of his Philosophy from p. 458. to
           470. --

           "I am confounded with that forlorn Solitude, in which I am
           placed in my Philosophy. {5} -- I have exposed myself to the
           Enmity of all Metaphysicians, Logicians, Mathematicians, and
           even Theologians. -- I have declared my Disapprobations of
           their Systems. -- When I turn my Eye inward, I find nothing
           but Doubt and Ignorance. All the World conspires to oppose and
           contradict me; tho' such is my Weakness, that I feel all my
           Opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by
           the Approbation of others. -- Can I be sure, that, in leaving
           all established Opinions, I am following Truth? and by what
           Criterion shall I distinguish her, even if Fortune should at
           last guide me on her Footsteps? After the most accurate and
           exact of my Reasonings, I can give no Reason why I should
           assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong Propensity to
           consider Objects strongly in that View under which they appear
           to me. -- The Memory, Senses, and Understanding, are all of
           them founded on the Imagination. -- No Wonder a Principle so
           inconstant and fallacious should lead us into Errors, when
           implicitely followed (as it must be) in all its Variations. --
           I have already shown, that the Understanding, when it acts
           alone, and according to its most general Principles, entirely
           subverts itself, and leaves {6} not the lowest Degree of
           Evidence in any Proposition either in Philosophy or common
           Life. -- We have no Choice left, but betwixt a false Reason
           and none at all. -- Where am I, or what? From what Causes do I
           derive my Existence, and to what Condition shall I return?
           Whose Favour shall I court, and whose Anger must I dread? What
           Beings surround me? On whom have I any Influence, or who have
           any Influence on me? I am confounded with all these Questions,
           and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable Condition
           imaginable, invironed with the deepest Darkness, and utterly
           deprived of the Use of every Member and Faculty. -- If I must
           be a Fool, as all those who reason or believe any Thing
           certainly are, my Follies shall at least be natural and
           agreeable. -- In all the Incidents of Life, we ought still to
           preserve our Scepticism: If we believe that Fire warms, or
           Water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much Pains
           to think otherwise; nay, if we are Philosophers, it ought only
           to be upon sceptical Principles. -- I cannot forbear having a
           Curiosity to be acquainted with the Principles of moral Good
           and Evil, &c. I am concerned for he Condition of the learned
           World, which lies under such a deplorable {7} Ignorance in all
           these Particulars. I feel an Ambition arise in me of
           contributing to the Instruction of Mankind, and of acquiring a
           Name by my Inventions and Discoveries. -- Should I endeavour
           to banish these Sentiments, I feel I should be a Loser in
           point of Pleasure; and this is the Origin of my Philosophy."

           Agreeable to this summary View, he tells us, p. 123.

             "Let us fix our Attention out of ourselves as much as
             possible. -- We really never advance a Step beyond
             ourselves; nor can conceive any Kind of Existence, but
             these Perceptions which have appeared in that narrow
             Compass: This is the Universe of the Imagination, nor have
             we any Idea but what is there produced."

   Accordingly,

     "An Opinion or Belief may be most accurately defined, A lively
     Idea related or associated with a present Impression; and is more
     properly an Act of the sensitive than of the cognitive Part of our
     Natures."

   And,

     "Belief in general consists in nothing but the Vivacity of an
     Idea. Again, the Idea of Existence is the very same with the Idea
     of what we conceive to be existent. -- Any Idea we please to form
     is the Idea of a Being; and the Idea of a Being is any Idea we
     please to form. And as to the {8} Notion of an external Existence,
     when taken for something specifically different from our
     Perceptions, we have shown its absurdity: And what we call a Mind
     is nothing but a Heap or Collection of different Perceptions
     united together by certain Relations, and supposed, tho' falsly,
     to be endowed with a perfect Simplicity."

   And,

     "The only Existence, of which we are certain, are Perceptions.
     When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
     stumble on some particular Perception or other. -- I never can
     catch myself at any Time without a Perception, and never can
     observe any Thing but the Perception. -- If any one think he has a
     different Notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer
     with him. -- I may venture to affirm of the rest of Mankind, that
     they are nothing but a Bundle of Perceptions, which succeed each
     other with an inconceivable Rapidity, and are in a perpetual Flux
     and Movement." --

   And lest the Reader should forget to apply all this to the Supreme
   Mind, and the Existence of the First Cause, he has a long Disquisition
   concerning Causes and Effects, the Sum of which amounts to this, That
   all our Reasoning concerning Causes and Effects are derived from
   nothing but Custom: That {9}