"if any pretend to define a Cause by saying it is something
     productive of another, 'tis evident he would say nothing; for what
     does he mean by Production? That we may define a Cause to be an
     Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the
     Objects resembling the former are placed in like Relations of
     Precedency and Contiguity to these Objects that resemble the
     latter; or, a Cause is an Object precedent and contiguous to
     another, and so united with it, that the Idea of the one
     determines the Mind to form the Idea of the other, and the
     Impression of the one to form a more lively Idea of the other."

   From these clear and plain Definitions he infers,

     "That all Causes are of the same Kind; and there is no Foundation
     for the Distinction betwixt efficient Causes, and Causes sine qua
     non; or betwixt efficient Causes, and formal and material, and
     exemplary, and final Causes: And that there is but one Kind of
     Necessity, and the common Distinction betwixt Moral and Physical
     is without any Foundation in Nature: And that the Distinction we
     often make betwixt Power, and the Exercise of it, is equally
     without Foundation: And that the Necessity of a Cause to every
     Beginning of Existence, is not founded on any Arguments
     demonstrative {10} or intuitive: And in fine, That any Thing may
     produce any Thing; Creation, Annihilation, Motion, Reason,
     Volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other
     Object we can imagine."

   The curious Nostrum he often repeats, p. 430, 434. Again he tells us,

     "That when we talk of any Being, whether of a Superior or Inferior
     Nature, as endowed with a Power or Force proportioned to any
     Effect, -- We have really no distinct Meaning, and make use only
     of common Words, without any clear and determinate Ideas. And if
     we have really no Idea of Power or Efficacy in any Object, or of
     any real connection betwixt Causes and Effects, 'twill be to
     little Purpose to prove that an Efficacy is necessary in all
     Operations. We do not understand our own Meaning in talking so,
     but ignorantly confound Ideas which are intirely distinct from
     each other."

   Again he says,

     "The Efficacy or Energy of Causes is neither placed in the Causes
     is neither placed in the Causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor
     in the Concurrence of these two Principles, but belongs entirely
     to the Soul (or the Bundle of Perceptions) which considers the
     Union of two or more Objects in all past Instances: 'Tis here that
     the real Power of Causes is {11} placed, along with their
     Connection and Necessity. And in fine, we may observe a
     Conjunction or a Relation of Cause and Effect between different
     Perceptions, but can never observe it between Perceptions and
     Objects."

   'Tis impossible therefore, that, from the Existence or any of the
   Qualities of the former, we can ever form any Conclusion concerning
   the Existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our Reason in this
   Particular with regard to the Existence of a Supreme Being. 'Tis well
   known that this Principle, Whatever begins to exist must have a Cause
   of Existence, is the first Step in the Argument for the Being of a
   Supreme Cause; and that, without it, 'tis impossible to go one Step
   further in that Argument. Now this Maxim he is at great Pains from
   p.141. to explode, and to show, "That it is neither intuitively nor
   demonstratively certain;" and he says,

     "Reason can never satisfy us that the Existence of any Object does
     ever imply that of another. So that, when we pass from the
     Impression of one to the Idea and Belief of another, we are not
     determined by Reason, but by Custom."

   In a marginal Note on the preceeding Page he says,

     "In that Proposition, God is, or indeed any other which regards
     Existence, the Idea of Existence is no distinct Idea {12} which we
     unite with that of the Object, and which is capable of forming a
     compound Idea by the Union."

   Concerning this Principle, That the Deity is the prime Mover of the
   Universe, who first created Matter, and gave its original Impulse, and
   likewise supports its Existence, and successively bestows on it its
   Motions; he says,

     "This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear
     superfluous to examine it in this Place. --For, if the very Idea
     be derived from an Impression, the Idea of a Deity proceeds from
     the same Origin; and, if no Impression implies any Force or
     Efficacy, 'tis equally impossible to discover, or even imagine,
     any such active Principle in the Deity. --Since Philosophers
     therefore have concluded, that Matter cannot be endowed with any
     efficacious Principle, because it is impossible to discover in it
     such a Principle; the same Course of Reasoning should determine
     them to exclude it from the Supreme Being: Or if they esteem that
     Opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how
     they may avoid it, and that is, by concluding from the very first,
     that they have no adequate Idea of Power of Efficacy in any
     Object; since neither in Body nor Spirit, neither in Superior nor
     {13} Inferior Natures, are they able to discover one single
     Instance of it."

   And says he, "We have no Idea of a Being endowed with any Power, much
   less of one endowed with any infinite Power."