Concerning the Immateriality of the Soul (from which the
           Argument is taken for its natural Immortality, or that it
           cannot perish by Dissolution as the Body) he says,

             "We certainly may conclude that Motion may be and actually
             is the Cause of Thought and Perception: And no wonder, for
             any Thing may be the Cause or Effect of any Thing; which
             evidently gives the Advantage to the Materialists above
             their Adversaries."

   But yet more plainly,

     "I assert, says he, that the Doctrine of the Immateriality,
     Simplicity, and Indivisibility of a thinking Substance, is a true
     Atheism, and will serve to justify all these Sentiments for which
     Spinoza is so universally infamous."

   This hideous Hypothesis is almost the same with that of the
   Immateriality of the Soul, which has become so popular. And again he
   endeavours to prove, that all the Absurdities which have been found in
   the Systems of Spinoza, may likewise be discovered in that of the
   Theologians: And concludes, that

     "We cannot advance one Step towards the establishing the
     Simplicity and Immateriality {14} of the Soul, without preparing
     the Way for a dangerous and irrecoverable Atheism."

           The Author's Sentiments in Morality we have in Vol. 3. printed
           for T. Longman, 1740. He there tells us, that

             "Reason has no Influence on our Passions and Actions:
             Actions may be laudable or blameable, but they cannot be
             reasonable or unreasonable. That all Beings in the
             Universe, considered in themselves, appear entirely loose
             and independent of each other; 'Tis only by Experience we
             learn their Influence and Connection, and this Influence
             we ought never to extend beyond Experience."

           He takes great Pains to prove, from p.37. That Justice is not
           a natural, but an artificial Virtue; and gives one pretty odd
           Reason for it:

             "We may conclude, that the Laws of Justice, being
             universal and perfectly inflexible, can never be derived
             from Nature. I suppose (says he) a Person to have lent me
             a Sum of Money, on Condition that it be restored in a few
             Days; and also suppose, that, after Expiration of the Term
             agreed on, he demands the Sum: I ask, What Reason or
             Motive have I to restore the Money? Publick Interest is
             not naturally attach'd to the Observation of the Rules of
             Justice, but {15} is only connected with it, after an
             artificial Convention, for Establishment of these Rules.
             Unless we will allow that Nature has established a
             Sophistry, and rendered it necessary and unavoidable; we
             must allow that the Sense of Justice and Injustice is not
             derived from Nature, but arises artificially, tho'
             necessarily, from Education and human Conventions. Here is
             a Proposition which I think may be regarded as certain,
             That it is only from the Selfishness and confined
             Generosity of Men, along with the scanty Provision Nature
             has made for his Wants, that Justice derives its Origin.
             These Impressions, which give Rise to this Sense of
             Justice, are not natural to the Mind of Man, but arise
             from Artifice and human Conventions. Without such a
             Convention, no one would ever have dreamed that there was
             such a Virtue as Justice, or have been induced to conform
             his Actions to it. Taking any single Act, my Justice may
             be pernicious in every Respect: And 'tis only upon the
             Supposition that others are to imitate my Example, that I
             can be induced to embrace that Virtue; since nothing but
             the Combination can render Justice advantageous, or afford
             me any Motive to conform myself to its Rules. {16} And in
             general it may be affirmed, that there is no such Passion
             in human Minds, as the Love of Mankind merely as such,
             independent of personal Qualities, of Service or of
             Relation to ourself."

           Mr. Hobbs, who was at Pains to shake loose all other natural
           Obligations, yet found it necessary to leave, or pretended to
           leave, the Obligation of Promises or Pactions; but our Author
           strikes a bolder Stroke:

             "That the Rule of Morality (says he) which enjoins the
             Performance of Promises, is not natural, will sufficiently
             appear from these two Propositions, which I proceed to
             prove, viz. That a Promise would not be intelligible
             before humans Conventions had established it; and that,
             even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended
             with any moral Obligation."

   And he concludes, "That Promises impose no natural Obligation." And,
   p.115.

     "I shall further observe, That since every new Promise imposes a
     new Obligation of Morality upon the Person who promises, and since
     this new Obligation arises from his Will, it is one of the most
     mysterious and incomprehensible Operations that can possible be
     imagined, and may even be compared to Transubstantiation or Holy
     Orders, where a certain Form of Words, along with a {17} certain