Intention, changes entirely the Nature of an external Object, and
     even of a human Creature. In fine (says he) as Force is supposed
     to invalidate all Contracts, such a Principle is a Proof that
     Promises have no natural Obligation, and are mere artificial
     Contrivances, for the Conveniency and Advantage of Society."

   Sum of the Charge.

           From the preceeding Specimen it will appear, that the Author
           maintains,

           1. Universal Scepticism. See his Assertions, p.458, --470.
           where he doubts of every Thing (his own Existence excepted)
           and maintains the Folly of pretending to believe any Thing
           with Certainty.

           2. Principles leading to downright Atheism, by denying the
           Doctrine of Causes and Effects, p.321, 138, 298, 300, 301,
           303, 430, 434, 284. where he maintains, that the Necessity of
           a Cause to every Beginning of Existence is not founded on any
           Arguments demonstrative or intuitive.

           3. Errors concerning the very Being and Existence of a God.
           For Instance, Marginal Note, p.172. as to that Proposition,
           God is, he says (or indeed as to any other Thing which regards
           Existence)

             "The Idea {18} of Existence is no distinct Idea which we
             unite with that of the Object, and which is capable of
             forming a compound Idea by Union."

           4. Errors concerning God's being the first Cause, and prime
           Mover of the Universe: For as to this Principle, That the
           Deity first created Matter, and gave it its original Impulse,
           and likewise supports its Existence, he says,

             "This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will
             appear superfluous to examine it in this Place, &c."

           5. He is chargable with denying the Immateriality of the Soul,
           and the Consequences flowing from this Denial, p.431, 4, 418,
           419, 423.

           6. With sapping the Foundations of Morality, by denying the
           natural and essential Difference betwixt Right and Wrong, Good
           and Evil, Justice and Injustice; making the Difference only
           artificial, and to arise from human Conventions and Compacts,
           Vol. 2. p.5, 19, 128, 41, 43, 48, 69, 70, 73, 4, 44.

   [Observations]

           You see, Dear Sir, that I have concealed no Part of the
           Accusation, but have inserted the Specimen and Charge, as
           transmitted to me, without the smallest Variation. I shall now
           go regularly thro' what is called the Sum of the Charge,
           because it {19} is intended, I suppose, to contain the
           Substance of the whole; and shall take Notice of the Specimen
           as I go along.

           1st, As to the Scepticism with which the Author is charged, I
           must observe, that the Doctrine of the Pyrrhonians or
           Scepticks have been regarded in all Ages as Principles of mere
           Curiosity, or a Kind of Feux d' esprit, without any Influence
           on a Man's steady Principles or Conduct in Life. In Reality, a
           Philosopher who affects to doubt of the Maxims of common
           Reason, and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he
           is not in earnest, and that he intends not to advance an
           Opinion which he would recommend as Standards of Judgment and
           Action. All he means by these Scruples is to abate the Pride
           of mere human Reasoners, by showing them, that even with
           regard to Principles which seem the clearest, and which they
           are necessitated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to
           embrace, they are not able to attain a full Consistence and
           absolute Certainty. Modesty then, and Humility, with regard to
           the Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of
           Scepticism; not an universal Doubt, which it is impossible for
           any Man to support, and which the first and most trivial
           Accident in Life must immediately disconcert and destroy. {20}

           How is such a Frame of Mind prejudicial to Piety? And must not
           a Man be ridiculous to assert that our Author denies the
           Principles of Religion, when he looks upon them as equally
           certain with the Objects of his Senses? If I be as much
           assured of these Principles, as that this Table at which I now
           write is before me; Can any Thing further be desired by the
           most rigorous Antagonist? 'Tis evident, that so extravagant a
           Doubt as that which Scepticism may seem to recommend, by
           destroying every Thing, really affects nothing, and was never
           intended to be understood seriously, but was meant as a mere
           Philosophical Amusement, or Trial of Wit and Subtility.

           This is a Construction suggested by the very Nature of the
           Subject; but he has not been contented with that, but
           expressly declared it. And all those Principles, cited in the
           Specimen as Proofs of his Scepticism, are positively renounced
           in a few Pages afterwards, and called the Effects of
           Philosophical Melancholy and Delusion. These are his very
           Words; and his Accuser's overlooking them may be thought very
           prudent, but is a Degree of Unfairness which appears to me
           altogether astonishing.