Were Authorities proper to be employed in any Philosophical
           Reasoning, I could cite you that of Socrates the wisest and
           {21} most religious of the Greek Philosophers, as well as
           Cicero among the Romans, who both of them carried their
           Philosophical Doubts to the highest Degree of Scepticism. All
           the antient Fathers, as well as our first Reformers, are
           copious in representing the Weakness and Uncertainty of mere
           human Reason. And Monsieur Huet the learned Bishop of
           Avaranches (so celebrated for his Demonstration Evangelique
           which contains all the great Proofs of the Christian Religion)
           wrote also a Book on this very Topick, wherein he endeavours
           to revive all the Doctrines of the antient Skepticks or
           Pyrrhonians.

           In Reality, whence come all the various Tribes of Hereticks,
           the Arians, Socinians and Deists, but from too great a
           Confidence in mere human Reason, which they regard as the
           Standard of every Thing, and which they will not submit to the
           superior Light of Revelation? And can one do a more essential
           Service to Piety, than by showing them that this boasted
           Reason of theirs, so far from accounting for the great
           Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, is not able fully to
           satisfy itself with regard to its own Operations, and must in
           some Measure fall into a Kind of implicite Faith, even in the
           most obvious and familiar Principles?

           II. The Author is charged with Opinions {22} leading to
           downright Atheism, chiefly by denying this Principle, That
           whatever begins to exist must have a Cause of Existence. To
           give you a Notion of the Extravagance of this Charge, I must
           enter into a little Detail. It is common for Philosophers to
           distinguish the Kinds of Evidence into intuitive,
           demonstrative, sensible, and moral; by which they intend only
           to mark a Difference betwixt them, not to denote a Superiority
           of one above another. Moral Certainty may reach as high a
           Degree of Assurance as Mathematical; and our Senses are surely
           to be comprised amongst the clearest and most convincing of
           all Evidences. Now, it being the Author's Purpose, in the
           Pages cited in the Specimen, to examine the Grounds of that
           Proposition; he used the Freedom of disputing the common
           Opinion, that it was founded on demonstrative or intuitive
           Certainty; but asserts, that it is supported by moral Evidence,
           and is followed by a Conviction of the same Kind with these
           Truths, That all Men must die, and that the Sun will rise
           To-morrow. Is this any Thing like denying the Truth of that
           Proposition, which indeed a Man must have lost all common
           Sense to doubt of?

           But, granting that he had denied it, how is this a Principle
           that leads to Atheism? {23} It would be no difficult Matter to
           show, that the Arguments a posteriori from the Order and
           Course of Nature, these Arguments so sensible, so convincing,
           and so obvious, remain still in their full Force; and that
           nothing is affected by it but the metaphysical Argument a
           priori, which many Men of Learning cannot comprehend, and
           which many Men both of Piety and Learning show no great Value
           for. Bishop Tillotson has used a Degree of Freedom on this
           Head, which I would not willingly allow myself; 'tis in his
           excellent Sermon concerning the Wisdom of being religious,
           where he says, That the Being of a God is not capable of
           Demonstration, but of moral Evidence. I hope none will pretend
           that pious Prelate intended by these Assertions to weaken the
           Evidences for a Divine Existence, but only to distinguish
           accurately its Species of Evidence.

           I say further, that even the metaphysical Arguments for a
           Deity are not affected by a Denial of the Proposition
           above-mentioned. It is only Dr. Clark's Argument which can be
           supposed to be any way concerned. Many other Arguments of the
           same Kind still remain; Des Cartes's for Instance, which has
           always been esteemed as solid and convincing as the other. I
           shall add, that a great Distinction ought always to be {24}
           made betwixt a Man's positive and avowed Opinions, and the
           Inferences which it may please others to draw from them. Had
           the Author really denied the Truth of the foregoing
           Proposition, (which the most superficial Reader cannot think
           ever entered his Head) still he could not properly be charged
           as designing to invalidate any one Argument that any
           Philosopher has employed for a Divine Existence; that is only
           an Inference and Construction of others, which he may refuse
           if he thinks proper.

           Thus you may judge of the Candor of the whole Charge, when you
           see the assigning of one Kind of Evidence for a Proposition,
           instead of another, is called denying that Proposition; that
           the invalidating only one Kind of Argument for the Divine
           Existence is called positive Atheism; nay, that the weakning
           only of one individual Argument of that Kind is called
           rejecting that whole Species of Argument, and the Inferences
           of others are ascribed to the Author as his real Opinion.

           'Tis impossible ever to satisfy a captious Adversary, but it
           would be easy for me to convince the severest Judge, that all
           the solid Arguments for Natural Religion retain their full
           Force upon the Author's Principles concerning Causes and
           Effects and that there is no Necessity even for altering {25}
           the common Methods of expressing or conceiving these
           Arguments. The Author has indeed asserted, That we can judge
           only of the Operations of Causes by Experience, and that,