reasoning a priori, any thing might appear able to produce any
           thing. We could not know that Stones would descend, or fire
           burn, had we not Experience of these Effects; and indeed,
           without such Experience, we could not certainly infer the
           Existence of one Thing from that of another. This is no great
           Paradox, but seems to have been the Opinion of several
           Philosophers, and seems the most obvious and familiar
           Sentiment on that Subject; but, tho' all Inferences are noway
           weakned by such an Assertion, but on the contrary will be
           found to acquire more Force, as long as Men are disposed to
           trust to their Experience rather than to mere human Reasoning.
           Wherever I see Order, I infer from Experience that there,
           there hath been Design and Contrivance. And the same Principle
           which leads me into this Inference, when I contemplate a
           Building, regular and beautiful in its whole Frame and
           Structure; the same Principle obliges me to infer an
           infinitely perfect Architect, from the infinite Art and
           Contrivance which is display'd in the whole {26} Fabrick of
           the Universe. Is not this the Light in which this Argument
           hath been placed by all Writers concerning Natural Religion?

           III. The next Proof of Atheism is so unaccountable, that I
           know not what to make of it. Our Author indeed asserts, after
           the present pious and learned Bishop of Cloyne, That we have
           no abstract or general Ideas, properly so speaking; and that
           those Ideas, which are called general, are nothing but
           particular Ideas affixed to general Terms. Thus, when I think
           of a Horse in general, I must always conceive that Horse as
           black or white, fat or lean, &c. and can form no Notion of a
           Horse that is not of some particular Colour or Size. In
           Prosecution of the same Topick, the Author hath said, That we
           have no general Idea of Existence, distinct from every
           particular Existence. But a Man must have strange Sagacity,
           that could discover Atheism in so harmless a Proposition.
           This, in my Opinion, might be justified before the University
           of Salamanca, or a Spanish Inquisition. I do indeed believe,
           that, when we assert the Existence of a Deity, we do not form
           a general abstract Idea of Existence, which we unite with the
           Idea of God, and which is capable of forming a compound Idea
           by Union; but this is {27} the Case with regard to every
           Proposition concerning Existence. So that, by this Course of
           Reasoning, we must deny the Existence of every Thing, even of
           ourselves, of which at least even the Accuser himself will
           admit our Author is perswaded.

           IV. Ere answering the fourth Charge, I must use the Freedom to
           deliver a short History of a particular Opinion in Philosophy.
           When Men considered the several Effects and Operations of
           Nature, they were led to examine into the Force or Power by
           which they were performed; and they divided into several
           Opinions upon this Head, according as their other Principles
           were more or less favourable to Religion. The Followers of
           Epicurus and Strato asserted, That this Force was original and
           inherent in Matter, and, operating blindly, produced all the
           various Effects which we behold. The Platonick and
           Peripatetick Schools, perceiving the Absurdity of this
           Proposition, ascribed the Origin of all Force to one primary
           efficient Cause, who first bestowed it on Matter, and
           successively guided it in all its Operations. But all the
           antient Philosophers agreed, that there was a real Force in
           Matter, either original or derived; and that it was really
           Fire which burnt, and Food that nourished, when we observed
           any of these {28} Effects to follow upon the Operations of
           these Bodies: The Schoolmen supposed also a real Power in
           Matter, to whose Operations however the continual Concurrence
           of the Deity was requisite, as well as to the Support of that
           Existence which had been bestowed on Matter, and which they
           considered as a perpetual Creation. No one, till Des Cartes
           and Malbranche, ever entertained an Opinion that Matter had no
           Force either primary or secondary, and independent or
           concurrent, and could not so much as properly be called an
           Instrument in the Hands of the Deity, to serve any of the
           Purposes of Providence. These Philosophers last-mentioned
           substituted the Notion of occasional Causes, by which it was
           asserted that a Billiard Ball did not move another by its
           Impulse, but was only the Occasion why the Deity, in pursuance
           of general Laws, bestowed Motion on the second Ball. But, tho'
           this Opinion be very innocent, it never gained great Credit,
           especially in England, where it was considered as too much
           contrary to received popular Opinions, and too little
           supported by Philosophical Arguments, ever to be admitted as
           any Thing but a mere Hypothesis. Cudworth, Lock and Clark make
           little or no mention of it. Sir Isaac Newton (tho' some of his
           Followers have taken {29} a different Turn of thinking)
           plainly rejects it, by substituting the Hypothesis of an
           AEtheral Fluid, not the immediate Volition of the Deity, as
           the Cause of Attraction. And, in short, this has been a
           Dispute left entirely to the Arguments of Philosophers, and in
           which Religion has never been supposed to be in the least
           concerned.

           Now it is evidently concerning this Cartesian Doctrine, of
           secondary Causes, the Author is treating, when he says, (in
           the Passage referred to in the Charge) That it was a curious
           Opinion, but which it would appear superfluous to examine in
           that Place.

           The Topick there handled is somewhat abstract: But I believe
           any Reader will easily perceive the Truth of this Assertion,
           and that the Author is far from pretending to deny (as