asserted in the Charge) God's being the first Cause and prime
Mover of the Universe. That the Author's Words could have no
such Meaning as they stand connected, is to me so evident,
that I could pledge on this Head, not only my small Credit as
a Philosopher, but even all my Pretensions to Trust or Belief
in the common Affairs of Life.
V. As to the fifth Article; The Author has not anywhere that I
remember denied {30} the Immateriality of the Soul in the
common Sense of the Word. He only says, That that Question did
not admit of any distinct Meaning; because we had no distinct
Idea of Substance. This Opinion may be found everywhere in Mr.
Lock, as well as in Bishop Berkley.
VI. I come now to the last Charge, which, according to the
prevalent Opinion of Philosophers in this Age, will certainly
be regarded as the severest, viz. the Author's destroying all
the Foundations of Morality.
He hath indeed denied the eternal Difference of Right and
Wrong in the Sense in which Clark and Woolaston maintained
them, viz.. That the Propositions of Morality were of the same
Nature with the Truths of Mathematicks and the abstract
Sciences, the Objects merely of Reason, not the Feelings of
our internal Tastes and Sentiments. In this Opinion he concurs
with all the antient Moralists, as well as with Mr. Hutchison
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow,
who, with others, has revived the antient Philosophical
Discourse, in order to throw an Odium on the Author!
When the Author asserts that Justice is an artificial not a
natural Virtue, he seems {31} sensible that he employed Words
that admit of an invidious Construction; and therefore makes
use of all proper Expedients, by Definitions and Explanations,
to prevent it. But of these his Accuser takes no Notice. By
the natural Virtues he plainly understands Compassion and
Generosity, and such as we are immediately carried to by a
natural Instinct, a certain Reflection on the general
Interests of Human Society, and a Combination with others. In
the same Sense, Sucking is an Action natural to Man, and
Speech is artificial. But what is there in this Doctrine that
can be supposed in the least pernicious? Has he not expresly
asserted, That Justice, in another Sense of the Word, is so
natural to Man, that no Society of Men, and even no individual
Member of any Society, was ever entirely devoid of all Sense
of it? Some Persons (tho' without any Reason, in my Opinion)
are displeased with Mr. Hutchison's Philosophy, in sounding
all the Virtues so much on Instinct, and admitting so little
of Reason and Reflection. Those should be pleased to find that
so considerable a Branch of the Moral Duties are founded on
that Principle.
The Author has likewise taken care in {32} positive Terms to
assert, That he does not maintain that Men ly under no
Obligation to observe Contracts, independent of Society; but
only, that they never would have formed Contracts, and even
would not have understood the Meaning of them, independent of
Society. And whereas it is observed in the Specimen, That our
Author offers further to prove, that, suppose a Promise was
intelligible before Human Conventions had established it, it
would not be attended with any Moral Obligation. The most
careless Reader must perceive that he does not understand
Moral in such an extended Sense, as to deny the Obligation of
Promises, independent of Society; seeing he not only asserts
what is above-represented, but likewise that the Laws of
Justice are universal, and perfectly inflexible. It is
evident, that suppose Mankind, in some primitive unconnected
State, should be some Means come to the Knowledge of the
Nature of those Things which we call Contracts and Promises;
that this Knowledge would have laid them under no such actual
Obligation, if not placed in such Circumstances as give rise
to these Contracts.
I am sorry I should be obliged to cite from my Memory, and
cannot mention Page and Chapter so accurately as the Accuser.
I came hither by Post, and brought no {33} Books along with
me, and cannot now provide myself in the Country with the Book
referred to.
This long Letter, with which I have troubled you, was composed
in one Morning, that I might gratify your Demand of an
immediate Answer to the heavy Charge brought against your
Friend; and this, I hope, will excuse any Inaccuracies that
may have crept into it. I am indeed of Opinion, that the
Author had better delayed the publishing of that Book; not on
account of any dangerous Principles contained in it, but
because on more mature Consideration he might have rendered it
much less imperfect by further Corrections and Revisals. I
must not at the same Time omit observing, that nothing can be
wrote so accurately or innocently, which may not be perverted
by such Arts as have been imployed on this Occasion. No Man
would undertake so invidious a Task as that of our Author's
Accuser, who was not actuated by particular Interests; and you
know how easy it is, by broken and partial Citations, to
pervert any Discourse, much more one of so abstract a Nature,
where it is difficult, or almost impossible, to justify one's
self to the Publick. The Words which have been carefully pickt
out from a large Volume will no doubt have a dangerous Aspect
to careless {34} Readers; and the Author, in my Apprehension,
cannot fully defend himself without a particular Detail, which
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