determined, in the empirical field no such determination of bounds
is possible.

          VII. The Aesthetic Representation of the

                     Finality of Nature.

  That which is purely subjective in the representation of an
object, i.e., what constitutes its reference to the subject, not to
the object, is its aesthetic quality. On the other hand, that which in
such a representation serves, or is available, for the determination
of the object (for or purpose of knowledge), is its logical
validity. In the cognition of an object of sense, both sides are
presented conjointly. In the sense-representation of external
things, the quality of space in which we intuite them is the merely
subjective side of my representation of them (by which what the things
are in themselves as objects is left quite open), and it is on account
of that reference that the object in being intuited in space is also
thought merely as phenomenon. But despite its purely subjective
quality, space is still a constituent of the knowledge of things as
phenomena. Sensation (here external) also agrees in expressing a
merely subjective side of our representations of external things,
but one which is properly their matter (through which we are given
something with real existence), just as space is the mere a priori
form of the possibility of their intuition; and so sensation is,
none the less, also employed in the cognition of external objects.

  But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable of
becoming an element of cognition, is the pleasure or displeasure
connected with it; for through it I cognize nothing in the object of
the representation, although it may easily be the result of the
operation of some cognition or other. Now the finality of a thing,
so far as represented in our perception of it, is in no way a
quality of the object itself (for a quality of this kind is not one
that can be perceived), although it may be inferred from a cognition
of things. In the finality, therefore, which is prior to the cognition
of an object, and which, even apart from any desire to make use of the
representation of it for the purpose of a cognition, is yet
immediately connected with it, we have the subjective quality
belonging to it that is incapable of becoming a constituent of
knowledge. Hence we only apply the term final to the object on account
of its representation being immediately coupled with the feeling of
pleasure: and this representation itself is an aesthetic
representation of the finality. The only question is whether such a
representation of finality exists at all.

  If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (apprehensio) of
the form of an object of intuition, apart from any reference it may
have to a concept for the purpose of a definite cognition, this does
not make the representation referable to the object, but solely to the
subject. In such a case, the pleasure can express nothing but the
conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into
play in the reflective judgement, and so far as they are in play,
and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the object. For
that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place
without the reflective judgement, even when it has no intention of
so doing, comparing them at least with its faculty of referring
intuitions to concepts. If, now, in this comparison, imagination (as
the faculty of intuitions a priori) is undesignedly brought into
accord with understanding (as the faculty of concepts), by means of
a given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby
aroused, then the object must be regarded as final for the
reflective judgement. A judgement of this kind is an aesthetic
judgement upon the finality of the object, which does not depend
upon any present concept of the object, and does not provide one. When
the form of an object (as opposed to the matter of its representation,
as sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, without
regard to any concept to be obtained from it, estimated as the
ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object, then
this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the
representation of it, and so not merely for the subject apprehending
this form, but for all in general who pass judgement. The object is
then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a
pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste. For
since the ground of the pleasure is made to reside merely in the
form of the object for reflection generally, consequently not in any
sensation of the object, and without any reference, either, to any
concept that might have something or other in view, it is with the
conformity to law in the empirical employment of judgement generally
(unity of imagination and understanding) in the subject, and with this
alone, that the representation of the object in reflection, the
conditions of which are universally valid a priori, accords. And, as
this accordance of the object with the faculties of the subject is
contingent, it gives rise to a representation of a finality on the
part of the object in respect of the cognitive faculties of the
subject.

  Here, now, is a pleasure which-as is the case with all pleasure or
displeasure that is not brought about through the agency of the
concept of freedom (i.e., through the antecedent determination of
the higher faculty of desire by means of pure reason)-no concepts
could ever enable us to regard as necessarily connected with the
representation of an object. It must always be only through reflective
perception that it is cognized as conjoined with this
representation. As with all empirical judgements, it is, consequently,
unable to announce objective necessity or lay claim to a priori
validity. But, then, the judgement of taste in fact only lays claim,
like every other empirical judgement, to be valid for every one,
and, despite its inner contingency this is always possible. The only
point that is strange or out of the way about it is that it is not