validity for every one; but the good is only represented as an
object of universal delight by means of a concept, which is the case
neither with the agreeable nor the beautiful.

       SS 8. In a judgement of taste the universality of

          delight is only represented as subjective.

  This particular form of the universality of an aesthetic
judgement, which is to be met in a judgement of taste, is a
significant feature, not for the logician certainly, but for the
transcendental philosopher. It calls for no small effort on his part
to discover its origin, but in return it brings to light a property of
our cognitive faculty which, without this analysis, would have
remained unknown.

  First, one must get firmly into one's mind that by the judgement
of taste (upon the beautiful) the delight in an object is imputed to
every one, yet without being founded on a concept (for then it would
be the good), and that this claim to universality is such an essential
factor of a judgement by which we describe anything as beautiful, that
were it not for its being present to the mind it would never enter
into any one's head to use this expression, but everything that
pleased without a concept would be ranked as agreeable. For in respect
of the agreeable, every one is allowed to have his own opinion, and no
one insists upon others agreeing with his judgement of taste, which is
what is invariably done in the judgement of taste about beauty. The
first of these I may call the taste of sense, the second, the taste of
reflection: the first laying down judgements merely private, the
second, on the other hand, judgements ostensibly of general validity
(public), but both alike being aesthetic (not practical) judgements
about an object merely in respect of the bearings of its
representation on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Now it
does seem strange that while with the taste of sense it is not alone
experience that shows that its judgement (of pleasure or displeasure
in something) is not universally valid, but every one willingly
refrains from imputing this agreement to others (despite the
frequent actual prevalence of a considerable consensus of general
opinion even in these judgements), the taste of reflection, which,
as experience teaches, has often enough to put up with a rude
dismissal of its claims to universal validity of its judgement (upon
the beautiful), can (as it actually does) find it possible for all
that to formulate judgements capable of demanding this agreement in
its universality. Such agreement it does in fact require from every
one for each of its judgements of taste the persons who pass these
judgements not quarreling over the possibility of such a claim, but
only failing in particular cases to come to terms as to the correct
application of this faculty.

  First of all we have here to note that a universality which does not
rest upon concepts of the object (even though these are only
empirical) is in no way logical, but aesthetic, i. e., does not
involve any objective quantity of the judgement, but only one that
is subjective. For this universality I use the expression general
validity, which denotes the validity of the reference of a
representation, not to the cognitive faculties, but to the feeling
of pleasure or displeasure for every subject. (The same expression,
however, may also be employed for the logical quantity of the
judgement, provided we add objective universal validity, to
distinguish it from the merely subjective validity which is always
aesthetic.)

  Now a judgement that has objective universal validity has always got
the subjective also, i.e., if the judgement is valid for everything
which is contained under a given concept, it is valid also for all who
represent an object by means of this concept. But from a subjective
universal validity, i. e., the aesthetic, that does not rest on any
concept, no conclusion can be drawn to the logical; because judgements
of that kind have no bearing upon the object. But for this very reason
the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgement must also be of a
special kind, seeing that it does not join the predicate of beauty
to the concept of the object taken in its entire logical sphere, and
yet does extend this predicate over the whole sphere of judging
subjects.

  In their logical quantity, all judgements of taste are singular
judgements. For, since I must present the object immediately to my
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and that, too, without the aid
of concepts, such judgements cannot have the quantity of judgements
with objective general validity. Yet by taking the singular
representation of the object of the judgement of taste, and by
comparison converting it into a concept according to the conditions
determining that judgement, we can arrive at a logically universal
judgement. For instance, by a judgement of the taste I describe the
rose at which I am looking as beautiful. The judgement, on the other
hand, resulting from the comparison of a number of singular
representations: "Roses in general are beautiful," is no longer
pronounced as a purely aesthetic judgement, but as a logical judgement
founded on one that is aesthetic. Now the judgement, "The rose is
agreeable" (to smell) is also, no doubt, an aesthetic and singular
judgement, but then it is not one of taste but of sense. For it has
this point of difference from a judgement of taste, that the latter
imports an aesthetic quantity of universality, i.e., of validity for
everyone which is not to be met with in a judgement upon the
agreeable. It is only judgements upon the good which, while also
determining the delight in an object, possess logical and not mere
aesthetic universality; for it is as involving a cognition of the
object that "they are valid of it, and on that account valid for
everyone.