III. The Critique of Judgement as a means of

           connecting the two Parts of Philosophy

                       in a whole.

  The critique which deals with what our cognitive faculties are
capable of yielding a priori has properly speaking no realm in respect
of objects; for it is not a doctrine, its sole business being to
investigate whether, having regard to the general bearings of our
faculties, a doctrine is possible by their means, and if so, how.
Its field extends to all their pretentions, with a view to confining
them within their legitimate bounds. But what is shut out of the
division of philosophy may still be admitted as a principal part
into the general critique of our faculty of pure cognition, in the
event, namely, of its containing principles which are not in
themselves available either for theoretical or practical employment.

  Concepts of nature contain the ground of all theoretical cognition a
priori and rest, as we saw, upon the legislative authority of
understanding. The concept of freedom contains the ground of all
sensuously unconditioned practical precepts a priori, and rests upon
that of reason. Both faculties, therefore, besides their application
in point of logical form to principles of whatever origin, have, in
addition, their own peculiar jurisdiction in the matter of their
content, and so, there being no further (a priori) jurisdiction
above them, the division of philosophy into theoretical and
practical is justified.

  But there is still further in the family of our higher cognitive
faculties a middle term between understanding and reason. This is
judgement, of which we may reasonably presume by analogy that it may
likewise contain, if not a special authority to prescribe laws,
still a principle peculiar to itself upon which laws are sought,
although one merely subjective a priori. This principle, even if it
has no field of objects appropriate to it as its realm, may still have
some territory or other with a certain character, for which just
this very principle alone may be valid.

  But in addition to the above considerations there is yet (to judge
by analogy) a further ground, upon which judgement may be brought into
line with another arrangement of our powers of representation, and one
that appears to be of even greater importance than that of its kinship
with the family of cognitive faculties. For all faculties of the soul,
or capacities, are reducible to three, which do not admit of any
further derivation from a common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of desire.* For
the faculty of cognition understanding alone is legislative, if (as
must be the case where it is considered on its own account free of
confusion with the faculty of desire) this faculty, as that of
theoretical cognition, is referred to nature, in respect of which
alone (as phenomenon) it is possible for us to prescribe laws by means
of a priori concepts of nature, which are properly pure concepts of
understanding. For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty
operating under the concept of freedom, only reason (in which alone
this concept has a place) prescribes laws a priori. Now between the
faculties of knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure, just
as judgement is intermediate between understanding and reason. Hence
we may, provisionally at least, assume that judgement likewise
contains an a priori principle of its own, and that, since pleasure or
displeasure is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire (be
it antecedent to its principle, as with the lower desires, or, as with
the higher, only supervening upon its determination by the moral law),
it will effect a transition from the faculty of pure knowledge,
i.e., from the realm of concepts of nature, to that of the concept
of freedom, just as i its logical employment it makes possible the
transition from understanding to reason.

  *Where one has reason to suppose that a relation subsists between
concepts that are used as empirical principles and the faculty of pure
cognition a priori, it is worth while attempting, in consideration
of this connection, to give them a transcendental definition-a
definition, that is, by pure categories, so far as these by themselves
adequately indicate the distinction of the concept in question from
others. This course follows that of the mathematician, who leaves
the empirical data of his problem indeterminate, and only brings their
relation in pure synthesis under the concepts of pure arithmetic,
and thus generalizes his solution.-I have been taken to task for
adopting a similar procedure and fault had been found with my
definition of the faculty of desire as a faculty which by means of its
representations is the cause of the cause of the actuality of the
objects of those representations: for mere wishes would still be
desires, and yet in their case every one is ready to abandon all claim
to being able by means of them alone to call their object into
existence. -But this proves no more than the presence of desires in
man by which he is in contradiction with himself. For in such a case
he seeks the production of the object by means of his representation
alone, without any hope of its being effectual, since he is
conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may so call those which are
not psychological), which would have to be determined by that
representation, are either unequal to the task of realizing the object
(by the intervention of means, therefore) or else are addressed to
what is quite impossible, as, for example, to undo the past (O mihi
praeteritos, etc.) or, to be able to annihilate the interval that,
with intolerable delay, divides us from the wished for moment. -Now,
conscious as we are in such fantastic desires of the inefficiency of
our representations (or even of their futility), as causes of their
objects, there is still involved in every wish a reference of the same
as cause, and therefore the representation of its causality, and
this is especially discernible where the wish, as longing, is an