2. The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rights
and duties:

  Adest. There is such a relation, for it is the relation of men to
men.

  3. The juridical relation of man to beings who have only duties
and no rights:

  Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings would be men
without juridical personality, as slaves of bondsmen.

  4 The juridical relation of man to a being who has only rights and
no duties (God):

  Vacat. There is no such relation in mere philosophy, because such
a being is not an object of possible experience.

  A real relation between right and duty is therefore found, in this
scheme, only in No. 2. The reason why such is not likewise found in
No. 4 is because it would constitute a transcendent duty, that is, one
to which no corresponding subject can be given that is external and
capable of imposing obligation. Consequently the relation from the
theoretical point of view is here merely ideal; that is, it is a
relation to an object of thought which we form for ourselves. But
the conception of this object is not entirely empty. On the
contrary, it is a fruitful conception in relation to ourselves and the
maxims of our inner morality, and therefore in relation to practice
generally. And it is in this bearing that all the duty involved and
practicable for us in such a merely ideal relation lies.

  III. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF

                     DUTIES GENERALLY.

  According to the constituent principles and the method of the
system.

  I. Principles    I. Duties of Right        I. Private Right.

                                             II. Public Right

                  II. Duties of Virtue, etc.

                      And so on, including all that

                      refers not only to the

                      materials, but also to the

                      architectonic form of a

                      scientific system of morals,

                      when the metaphysical

                      investigation of the elements

                      has completely traced out the

                      universal principles constituting

                      the whole.

  II. Method       I. Didactics

                  II. Ascetics

       GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

  I. THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE

                        MORAL LAWS.

  The active faculty of the human mind, as the faculty of desire in
its widest sense, is the power which man has, through his mental
representations, of becoming the cause of objects corresponding to
these representations. The capacity of a being to act in conformity
with his own representations is what constitutes the life of such a
being.

  It is to be observed, first, that with desire or aversion there is
always connected pleasure or pain, the susceptibility for which is
called feeling. But the converse does not always hold; for there may
be a pleasure connected, not with the desire of an object, but with
a mere mental representation, it being indifferent whether an object
corresponding to the representation exist or not. And second, the
pleasure or pain connected with the object of desire does not always
precede the activity of desire; nor can it be regarded in every case
as the cause, but it may as well be the effect of that activity. The
capacity of experiencing pleasure or pain on the occasion of a
mental representation is called "feeling," because pleasure and pain
contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental
activity. They do not involve any relation to an object that could
possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a
knowledge of our own mental state. For even sensations,* considered
apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the
modifications of the subject- as, for instance, in reference to red,
sweet, and such like- are referred as constituent elements of