connected in the subject with a determining principle of the will as
such. All legislation, therefore, may be differentiated by reference
to its motive-principle.* The legislation which makes an action a
duty, and this duty at the same time a motive, is ethical. That
legislation which does not include the motive-principle in the law,
and consequently admits another motive than the idea of duty itself,
is juridical. In respect of the latter, it is evident that the motives
distinct from the idea of duty, to which it may refer, must be drawn
from the subjective (pathological) influences of inclination and of
aversion, determining the voluntary activity, and especially from
the latter; because it is a legislation which has to be compulsory,
and not merely a mode of attracting or persuading. The agreement or
non-agreement of an action with the law, without reference to its
motive, is its legality; and that character of the action in which the
idea of duty arising from the law at the same time forms the motive of
the action, is its morality.

  *This ground of division will apply, although the action which it
makes a duty may coincide with another action that may be otherwise
looked at from another point of view. For instance, actions may in all
cases be classified as external.

  Duties specially in accord with a juridical legislation can only
be external duties. For this mode of legislation does not require that
the idea of the duty, which is internal, shall be of itself the
determining principle of the act of will; and as it requires a
motive suitable to the nature of its laws, it can only connect what is
external with the law. Ethical legislation, on the other hand, makes
internal actions also duties, but not to the exclusion of the
external, for it embraces everything which is of the nature of duty.
And just because just because ethical legislation includes within
its law the internal motive of the action as contained in the idea
of duty, it involves a characteristic which cannot at all enter into
the legislation that is external. Hence, ethical legislation cannot as
such be external, not even when proceeding from a Divine will,
although it may receive duties which rest on an external legislation
as duties, into the position of motives, within its own legislation.

  From what has been said, it is evident that all duties, merely
because they are duties, belong to ethics; and yet the legislation
upon which they are founded is not on that account in all cases
contained in ethics. On the contrary, the law of many of them lies
outside of ethics. Thus ethics commands that I must fulfil a promise
entered into by contract, although the other party might not be able
to compel me to do so. It adopts the law (pacta sunt servanda) and the
duty corresponding to it, from jurisprudence or the science of
right, by which they are established. It is not in ethics,
therefore, but in jurisprudence, that the principle of the legislation
lies, that "promises made and accepted must be kept." Accordingly,
ethics specially teaches that if the motive-principle of external
compulsion which juridical legislation connects with a duty is even
let go, the idea of duty alone is sufficient of itself as a motive.
For were it not so, and were the legislation itself not juridical, and
consequently the duty arising from it not specially a duty of right as
distinguished from a duty of virtue, then fidelity in the
performance of acts, to which the individual may be bound by the terms
of a contract, would have to be classified with acts of benevolence
and the obligation that underlies them, which cannot be correct. To
keep one's promise is not properly a duty of virtue, but a duty of
right, and the performance of it can be enforced by external
compulsion. But to keep one's promise, even when no compulsion can
be applied to enforce it, is, at the same time, a virtuous action, and
a proof of virtue. jurisprudence as the science of right, and ethics
as the science of virtue, are therefore distinguished not so much by
their different duties, as rather by the difference Of the legislation
which connects the one or the other kind of motive with their laws.

  Ethical legislation is that which cannot be external, although the
duties it prescribes may be external as well as internal. Juridical
legislation is that which may also be external. Thus it is an external
duty to keep a promise entered into by contract; but the injunction to
do this merely because it is a duty, without regard to any other
motive, belongs exclusively to the internal legislation. It does not
belong thus to the ethical sphere as being a particular kind of duty
or a particular mode of action to which we are bound- for it is an
external duty in ethics as well as in jurisprudence- but it is because
the legislation in the case referred to is internal, and cannot have
an external lawgiver, that the obligation is reckoned as belonging
to ethics. For the same reason, the duties of benevolence, although
they are external duties as obligations to external actions, are, in
like manner, reckoned as belonging to ethics, because they can only be
enjoined by legislation that is internal. Ethics has no doubt its
own peculiar duties- such as those towards oneself- but it bas also
duties in common with jurisprudence, only not under the same mode of
obligation. In short, the peculiarity of ethical legislation is to
enjoin the performance of certain actions merely because they are
duties, and to make the principle of duty itself- whatever be its
source or occasion- the sole sufficing motive of the activity of the
will. Thus, then, there are many ethical duties that are directly
such; and the inner legislation also makes the others- all and each of
them- indirectly ethical.

  The deduction of the division of a system is the proof of its
completeness as well as of its continuity, so that there may be a
logical transition from the general conception divided to the
members of the division, and through the whole series of the
subdivisions without any break or leap in the arrangement (divisio per
saltum). Such a division is one of the most difficult conditions for
the architect of a system to fulfil. There is even some doubt as to
what is the highest conception that is primarily divided into right