merae facultatis). It may be asked whether there are such morally
indifferent actions; and if there are, whether in addition to the
preceptive and prohibitive law (lex praeceptiva et prohibitiva, lex
mandati et vetiti), there is also required a permissive law (lex
permissiva), in order that one may be free in such relations to act,
or to forbear from acting, at his pleasure? If it were so, the moral
right in question would not, in all cases, refer to actions that are
indifferent in themselves (adiaphora); for no special law would be
required to establish such a right, considered according to moral
laws.

  An action is called an act- or moral deed- in so far as it is
subject to laws of obligation, and consequently in so far as the
subject of it is regarded with reference to the freedom of his
choice in the exercise of his will. The agent- as the actor or doer of
the deed- is regarded as, through the act, the author of its effect;
and this effect, along with the action itself, may be imputed to
him, if be previously knew the law in virtue of which an obligation
rested upon him.

  A person is a subject who is capable of having his actions imputed
to him. Moral personality is, therefore, nothing but the freedom of
a rational being under moral laws; and it is to be distinguished
from psychological freedom as the mere faculty by which we become
conscious of ourselves in different states of the identity of our
existence. Hence it follows that a person is properly subject to no
other laws than those he lays down for himself, either alone or in
conjunction with others.

  A thing is what is incapable of being the subject of imputation.
Every object of the free activity of the will, which is itself void of
freedom, is therefore called a thing (res corporealis).

  Right or wrong applies, as a general quality, to an act (rectum
aut minus rectum), in so far as it is in accordance with duty or
contrary to duty (factum licitum aut illicitum), no matter what may be
the subject or origin of the duty itself. An act that is contrary to
duty is called a transgression (reatus).

  An unintentional transgression of a duty, which is, nevertheless,
imputable to a person, is called a mere fault (culpa). An
intentional transgression- that is, an act accompanied with the
consciousness that it is a transgression- constitutes a crime (dolus).

  Whatever is juridically in accordance with external laws is said
to be just (jus, instum); and whatever is not juridically in
accordance with external laws is unjust (unjustum).

  A collision of duties or obligations (collisio officiorum s.
obligationum) would be the result of such a relation between them that
the one would annul the other, in whole or in part. Duty and
obligation, however, are conceptions which express the objective
practical necessity of certain actions, and two opposite rules
cannot be objective and necessary at the same time; for if it is a
duty to act according to one of them, it is not only no duty to act
according to an opposite rule, but to do so would even be contrary
to duty. Hence a collision of duties and obligations is entirely
inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur). There may, however, be
two grounds of obligation (rationes obligandi), connected with an
individual under a rule prescribed for himself, and yet neither the
one nor the other may be sufficient to constitute an actual obligation
(rationes obligandi non obligantes); and in that case the one of
them is not a duty. If two such grounds of obligation are actually
in collision with each other, practical philosophy does not say that
the stronger obligation is to keep the upper hand (fortior obligatio
vincit), but that the stronger ground of obligation is to maintain its
place (fortior obligandi ratio vincit).

  Obligatory Laws for which an external legislation is possible are
called generally external laws. Those external laws, the
obligatoriness of which can be recognised by reason a priori even
without an external legislation, are called natural laws. Those
laws, again, which are not obligatory without actual external
legislation, are called positive laws. An external legislation,
containing pure natural laws, is therefore conceivable; but in that
case a previous natural law must be presupposed to establish the
authority of the lawgiver by the right to subject others to obligation
through his own act of will.

  The principle which makes a certain action a duty is a practical
law. The rule of the agent or actor, which he forms as a principle for
himself on subjective grounds, is called his maxim. Hence, even when
the law is one and invariable, the maxims of the agent may yet be very
different.

  The categorical imperative only expresses generally what constitutes
obligation. It may be rendered by the following formula: "Act
according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a
universal law." Actions must therefore be considered, in the first
place, according to their subjective principle; but whether this
principle is also valid objectively can only be known by the criterion
of the categorical imperative. For reason brings the principle or
maxim of any action to the test, by calling upon the agent to think of
himself in connection with it as at the same time laying down a
universal law, and to consider whether his action is so qualified as
to be fit for entering into such a universal legislation.

  The simplicity of this law, in comparison with the great and
manifold consequences which may be drawn from it, as well as its
commanding authority and supremacy without the accompaniment of any