(impunibile). Yet this subjective condition of impunity, by a
strange confusion of ideas, has been regarded by jurists as equivalent
to objective lawfulness.

  The dictum of the right of necessity is put in these terms:
"Necessity has no law" (Necessitas non habet legem). And yet there
cannot be a necessity that could make what is wrong lawful.

  It is apparent, then, that in. judgements relating both to
"equity" and "the right of necessity," the equivocations involved
arise from an interchange of the objective and subjective grounds that
enter into the application of the principles of right, when viewed
respectively by reason or by a judicial tribunal. What one may have
good grounds for recognising as right, in itself, may not find
confirmation in a court of justice; and what he must consider to be
wrong, in itself, may obtain recognition in such a court. And the
reason of this is that the conception of right is not taken in the two
cases in one and the same sense.
DIVISION

              DIVISION OF THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT.

         A. General Division of the Duties of Right.

                    (Juridical Duties).

  In this division we may very conveniently follow Ulpian, if his
three formulae are taken in a general sense, which may not have been
quite clearly in his mind, but which they are capable of being
developed into or of receiving. They are the following:

  1. Honeste vive. "Live rightly." juridical rectitude, or honour
(honestas juridica), consists in maintaining one's own worth as a
man in relation to others. This duty may be rendered by the
proposition: "Do not make thyself a mere means for the use of
others, but be to them likewise an end." This duty will be explained
in the next formula as an obligation arising out of the right of
humanity in our own person (lex justi).

  2. Neminem laede. "Do wrong to no one." This formula may be rendered
so as to mean: "Do no wrong to any one, even if thou shouldst be under
the necessity, in observing this duty, to cease from all connection
with others and to avoid all society" (lex juridica).

  3. Suum cuique tribue. "Assign to every one what is his own." This
may be rendered, "Enter, if wrong cannot be avoided, into a society
with others in which every one may have secured to him what is his
own." If this formula were to be simply translated, "Give every one
his own," it would express an absurdity, for we cannot give any one
what he already has. If it is to have a definite meaning, it must
therefore run thus: "Enter into a state in which every one can have
what is his own secured against the action of every other" (lex
justitiae).

  These three classical formulae, at the same time, represent
principles which suggest a division of the system of juridical
duties into internal duties, external duties, and those connecting
duties which contain the latter as deduced from the principle of the
former by subsumption.

              B. Universal Division of Rights.

  I. Natural Right and Positive Right. The system of rights, viewed as
a scientific system of doctrines, is divided into natural right and
positive right. Natural right rests upon pure rational principles a
priori; positive or statutory right is what proceeds from the will
of a legislator.

  II. Innate Right and Acquired Right. The system of rights may
again be regarded in reference to the implied powers of dealing
morally with others as bound by obligations, that is, as furnishing
a legal title of action in relation to them. Thus viewed, the system
is divided into innate right and acquired right. Innate right is
that right which belongs to every one by nature, independent of all
juridical acts of experience. Acquired right is that right which is
founded upon such juridical acts.

  Innate right may also be called the "internal mine and thine"
(meum vel tuum internum) for external right must always be acquired.

    There is only one Innate Right, the Birthright of Freedom.

  Freedom is independence of the compulsory will of another; and in so
far as it can coexist with the freedom of all according to a universal
law, it is the one sole original, inborn right belonging to every
man in virtue of his humanity. There is, indeed, an innate equality
belonging to every man which consists in his right to be independent
of being bound by others to anything more than that to which he may
also reciprocally bind them. It is, consequently, the inborn quality
of every man in virtue of which he ought to be his own master by right
(sui juris). There is, also, the natural quality of justness
attributable to a man as naturally of unimpeachable right (justi),
because be has done no wrong to any one prior to his own juridical
actions. And, further, there is also the innate right of common action
on the part of every man, so that he may do towards others what does
not infringe their rights or take away anything that is theirs
unless they are willing to appropriate it; such merely to
communicate thought, to narrate anything, or to promise something
whether truly and honestly, or untruly and dishonestly (veriloquim aut
falsiloquim), for it rests entirely upon these others whether they