principle of right.

  For an object of any act of my will, is something that it would be
physically within my power to use. Now, suppose there were things that
by right should absolutely not be in our power, or, in other words,
that it would be wrong or inconsistent with the freedom of all,
according to universal law, to make use of them. On this
supposition, freedom would so far be depriving itself of the use of
its voluntary activity, in thus putting useable objects out of all
possibility of use. In practical relations, this would be to
annihilate them, by making them res nullius, notwithstanding the
fact act acts of will in relation to such things would formally
harmonize, in the actual use of them, with the external freedom of all
according to universal laws. Now the pure practical reason lays down
only formal laws as principles to regulate the exercise of the will;
and therefore abstracts from the matter of the act of will, as regards
the other qualities of the object, which is considered only in so
far as it is an object of the activity of the will. Hence the
practical reason cannot contain, in reference to such an object, an
absolute prohibition of its use, because this would involve a
contradiction of external freedom with itself. An object of my free
will, however, is one which I have the physical capability of making
some use of at will, since its use stands in my power (in potentia).
This is to be distinguished from having the object brought under my
disposal (in postestatem meam reductum), which supposes not a
capability merely, but also a particular act of the free-will. But
in order to consider something merely as an object of my will as such,
it is sufficient to be conscious that I have it in my power. It is
therefore an assumption a priori of the practical reason to regard and
treat every object within the range of my free exercise of will as
objectively a possible mine or thine.

  This postulate may be called "a permissive law" of the practical
reason, as giving us a special title which we could not evolve out
of the mere conceptions of right generally. And this title constitutes
the right to impose upon all others an obligation, not otherwise
laid upon them, to abstain from the use of certain objects of our free
choice, because we have already taken them into our possession. Reason
wills that this shall be recognised as a valid principle, and it
does so as practical reason; and it is enabled by means of this
postulate a priori to enlarge its range of activity in practice.

                3. Possession and Ownership.

  Any one who would assert the right to a thing as his must be in
possession of it as an object. Were he not its actual possessor or
owner, he could not be wronged or injured by the use which another
might make of it without his consent. For, should anything external to
him, and in no way connected with him by right, affect this object, it
could not affect himself as a subject, nor do him any wrong, unless he
stood in a relation of ownership to it.

           4. Exposition of the Conception of the.

                  External Mine and Thine.

  There can only be three external objects of my will in the
activity of choice:

  (1) A corporeal thing external to me;

  (2) The free-will of another in the performance of a particular
act (praestatio);

  (3) The state of another in relation to myself.

  These correspond to the categories of substance, causality, and
reciprocity; and they form the practical relations between me and
external objects, according to the laws of freedom.

  A. I can only call a corporeal thing or an object in space "mine,"
when, even although not in physical possession of it, I am able to
assert that I am in possession of it in another real nonphysical
sense. Thus, I am not entitled to call an apple mine merely because
I hold it in my hand or possess it physically; but only when I am
entitled to say, "I possess it, although I have laid it out of my
hand, and wherever it may lie." In like manner, I am not entitled to
say of the ground, on which I may have laid myself down, that
therefore it is mine; but only when I can rightly assert that it still
remains in my possession, although I may have left the spot. For any
one who, in the former appearances of empirical possession, might
wrench the apple out of my hand, or drag me away from my
resting-place, would, indeed, injure me in respect of the inner "mine"
of freedom, but not in respect of the external "mine," unless I
could assert that I was in the possession of the object, even when not
actually holding it physically. And if I could not do this, neither
could I call the apple or the spot mine.

  B. I cannot call the performance of something by the action of the
will of another "mine," if I can only say "it has come into my
possession at the same time with a promise" (pactum re initum); but
only if I am able to assert "I am in possession of the will of the
other, so as to determine him to the performance of a particular
act, although the time for the performance of it has not yet come." In
the latter case, the promise belongs to the nature of things
actually held as possessed, and as an active obligation I can reckon
it mine; and this holds good not only if I have the thing promised- as
in the first case- already in my possession, but even although I do
not yet possess it in fact. Hence, I must be able to regard myself
in thought as independent of that empirical form of possession that is