arrived in America the latter end of March. This motion was to be
laid, by the several governors then in being, before, the assembly
of each province; and the first assembly before which it was laid, was
the assembly of Pennsylvania, in May following. This being a just
state of the case, I then ask, why were hostilities commenced
between the time of passing the resolve in the House of Commons, of
the 20th of February, and the time of the assemblies meeting to
deliberate upon it? Degrading and famous as that motion was, there
is nevertheless reason to believe that the king and his adherents were
afraid the colonies would agree to it, and lest they should, took
effectual care they should not, by provoking them with hostilities
in the interim. They had not the least doubt at that time of
conquering America at one blow; and what they expected to get by a
conquest being infinitely greater than any thing they could hope to
get either by taxation or accommodation, they seemed determined to
prevent even the possibility of hearing each other, lest America
should disappoint their greedy hopes of the whole, by listening even
to their own terms. On the one hand they refused to hear the
petition of the continent, and on the other hand took effectual care
the continent should not hear them.
That the motion of the 20th February and the orders for commencing
hostilities were both concerted by the same person or persons, and not
the latter by General Gage, as was falsely imagined at first, is
evident from an extract of a letter of his to the administration, read
among other papers in the House of Commons; in which he informs his
masters, "That though their idea of his disarming certain counties was
a right one, yet it required him to be master of the country, in order
to enable him to execute it." This was prior to the commencement of
hostilities, and consequently before the motion of the 20th February
could be deliberated on by the several assemblies.
Perhaps it may be asked, why was the motion passed, if there was
at the same time a plan to aggravate the Americans not to listen to
it? Lord North assigned one reason himself, which was a hope of
dividing them. This was publicly tempting them to reject it; that
if, in case the injury of arms should fail in provoking them
sufficiently, the insult of such a declaration might fill it up. But
by passing the motion and getting it afterwards rejected in America,
it enabled them, in their wicked idea of politics, among other things,
to hold up the colonies to foreign powers, with every possible mark of
disobedience and rebellion. They had applied to those powers not to
supply the continent with arms, ammunition, etc., and it was necessary
they should incense them against us, by assigning on their own part
some seeming reputable reason why. By dividing, it had a tendency to
weaken the States, and likewise to perplex the adherents of America in
England. But the principal scheme, and that which has marked their
character in every part of their conduct, was a design of
precipitating the colonies into a state which they might afterwards
deem rebellion, and, under that pretence, put an end to all future
complaints, petitions and remonstrances, by seizing the whole at once.
They had ravaged one part of the globe, till it could glut them no
longer; their prodigality required new plunder, and through the East
India article tea they hoped to transfer their rapine from that
quarter of the world to this. Every designed quarrel had its pretence;
and the same barbarian avarice accompanied the plant to America, which
ruined the country that produced it.
That men never turn rogues without turning fools is a maxim,
sooner or later, universally true. The commencement of hostilities,
being in the beginning of April, was, of all times the worst chosen:
the Congress were to meet the tenth of May following, and the distress
the continent felt at this unparalleled outrage gave a stability to
that body which no other circumstance could have done. It suppressed
too all inferior debates, and bound them together by a necessitous
affection, without giving them time to differ upon trifles. The
suffering likewise softened the whole body of the people into a degree
of pliability, which laid the principal foundation-stone of union,
order, and government; and which, at any other time, might only have
fretted and then faded away unnoticed and unimproved. But
Providence, who best knows how to time her misfortunes as well as
her immediate favors, chose this to be the time, and who dare
dispute it?
It did not seem the disposition of the people, at this crisis, to
heap petition upon petition, while the former remained unanswered. The
measure however was carried in Congress, and a second petition was
sent; of which I shall only remark that it was submissive even to a
dangerous fault, because the prayer of it appealed solely to what it
called the prerogative of the crown, while the matter in dispute was
confessedly constitutional. But even this petition, flattering as it
was, was still not so harmonious as the chink of cash, and
consequently not sufficiently grateful to the tyrant and his ministry.
From every circumstance it is evident, that it was the determination
of the British court to have nothing to do with America but to conquer
her fully and absolutely. They were certain of success, and the
field of battle was the only place of treaty. I am confident there are
thousands and tens of thousands in America who wonder now that they
should ever have thought otherwise; but the sin of that day was the
sin of civility; yet it operated against our present good in the
same manner that a civil opinion of the devil would against our future
peace.
Independence was a doctrine scarce and rare, even towards the
conclusion of the year 1775; all our politics had been founded on
the hope of expectation of making the matter up- a hope, which, though
general on the side of America, had never entered the head or heart of
the British court. Their hope was conquest and confiscation. Good
heavens! what volumes of thanks does America owe to Britain? What
infinite obligation to the tool that fills, with paradoxical
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