from living, and reduce him to a state in which he might
rather be said to perish than to die.

Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly
arrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which,
would supersede, and render the obligations of law and government
unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other;
but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it will
unavoidably happen, that in proportion as they surmount the first
difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cause,
they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other;
and this remissness will point out the necessity of establishing
some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue.

Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under the branches
of which, the whole colony may assemble to deliberate on public matters.
It is more than probable that their first laws will have the title only
of REGULATIONS, and be enforced by no other penalty than public disesteem.
In this first parliament every man, by natural right, will have a seat.

But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increase
likewise, and the distance at which the members may be separated,
will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on
every occasion as at first, when their number was small,
their habitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling.
This will point out the convenience of their consenting to leave
the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen
from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns
at stake which those who appointed them, and who will act in the
same manner as the whole body would act, were they present.
If the colony continues increasing, it will become necessary
to augment the number of the representatives, and that the interest
of every part of the colony may be attended to, it will be found
best to divide the whole into convenient parts, each part sending
its proper number; and that the ELECTED might never form to themselves
an interest separate from the ELECTORS, prudence will point out
the propriety of having elections often; because as the ELECTED
might by that means return and mix again with the general body
of the ELECTORS in a few months, their fidelity to the public
will be secured by the prudent reflection of not making a rod
for themselves.  And as this frequent interchange will establish
a common interest with every part of the community, they will
mutually and naturally support each other, and on this (not on
the unmeaning name of king) depends the STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT,
AND THE HAPPINESS OF THE GOVERNED.

Here then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode rendered
necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world;
here too is the design and end of government, viz.  freedom and security.
And however our eyes may be dazzled with show, or our ears deceived by sound;
however prejudice may warp our wills, or interest darken our understanding,
the simple voice of nature and of reason will say, it is right.

I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature,
which no art can overturn, viz.  that the more simple any thing is,
the less liable it is to be disordered; and the easier repaired
when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks
on the so much boasted constitution of England.  That it was noble
for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected, is granted.
When the world was overrun with tyranny the least remove therefrom
was a glorious rescue.  But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions,
and incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.

Absolute governments (tho' the disgrace of human nature) have this
advantage with them, that they are simple; if the people suffer,
they know the head from which their suffering springs, know likewise
the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures.
But the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex,
that the nation may suffer for years together without being able to discover
in which part the fault lies; some will say in one and some in another,
and every political physician will advise a different medicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices,
yet if we will suffer ourselves to examine the component parts of the
English constitution, we shall find them to be the base remains of two
ancient tyrannies, compounded with some new republican materials.

FIRST - The remains of monarchial tyranny in the person of the king.
SECONDLY - The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
THIRDLY - The new republican materials in the persons of the commons,
          on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of the people;
wherefore in a CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE they contribute nothing towards
the freedom of the state.

To say that the constitution of England is a UNION of three powers
reciprocally CHECKING each other, is farcical, either the words have
no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things:

FIRST - That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after,
or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural
disease of monarchy.

SECONDLY - That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose,
are either wiser or more worthy of confidence than the crown.

But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power to check