the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power
to check the commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills;
it again supposes that the king is wiser than those whom it has already
supposed to be wiser than him.  A mere absurdity!

There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of monarchy;
it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him
to act in cases where the highest judgment is required.  The state of a king
shuts him from the world, yet the business of a king requires him to know
it thoroughly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally opposing
and destroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.

Some writers have explained the English constitution thus: The king,
say they, is one, the people another; the peers are a house in behalf
of the king, the commons in behalf of the people; but this hath all
the distinctions of a house divided against itself; and though
the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when examined,
they appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always happen,
that the nicest construction that words are capable of,
when applied to the description of some thing which either
cannot exist, or is too incomprehensible to be within
the compass of description, will be words of sound only,
and though they may amuse the ear, they cannot inform the mind,
for this explanation includes a previous question, viz.
HOW CAME THE KING BY A POWER WHICH THE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO TRUST,
AND ALWAYS OBLIGED TO CHECK?  Such a power could not be the gift
of a wise people, neither can any power, WHICH NEEDS CHECKING,
be from God; yet the provision, which the constitution makes,
supposes such a power to exist.

But the provision is unequal to the task; the means either cannot
or will not accomplish the end, and the whole affair is a felo de se;
for as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as all
the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one, it only remains to know
which power in the constitution has the most weight, for that will govern;
and though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or, as the phrase is,
check the rapidity of its motion, yet so long as they cannot stop it,
their endeavours will be ineffectual; the first moving power will
at last have its way, and what it wants in speed, is supplied by time.

That the crown is this overbearing part in the English constitution,
needs not be mentioned, and that it derives its whole consequence
merely from being the giver of places and pensions, is self-evident,
wherefore, though we have been wise enough to shut and lock a door
against absolute monarchy, we at the same time have been foolish
enough to put the crown in possession of the key.

The prejudice of Englishmen in favour of their own government by king,
lords, and commons, arises as much or more from national pride than reason.
Individuals are undoubtedly safer in England than in some other countries,
but the WILL of the king is as much the LAW of the land in Britain
as in France, with this difference, that instead of proceeding directly
from his mouth, it is handed to the people under the more formidable shape
of an act of parliament.  For the fate of Charles the First hath only made
kings more subtle - not more just.

Wherefore, laying aside all national pride and prejudice
in favour of modes and forms, the plain truth is, that
IT IS WHOLLY OWING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE,
AND NOT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT,
that the crown is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey.

An inquiry into the CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS in the English form
of government is at this time highly necessary; for as we are never
in a proper condition of doing justice to others, while we continue under
the influence of some leading partiality, so neither are we capable of
doing it to ourselves while we remain fettered by any obstinate prejudice.
And as a man.  who is attached to a prostitute, is unfitted to choose
or judge a wife, so any prepossession in favour of a rotten constitution
of government will disable us from discerning a good one.

OF MONARCHY AND HEREDITARY SUCCESSION

Mankind being originally equals in the order of creation, the equality
could only be destroyed by some subsequent circumstance; the distinctions
of rich, and poor, may in a great measure be accounted for, and that without
having recourse to the harsh, ill-sounding names of oppression and avarice.
Oppression is often the CONSEQUENCE, but seldom or never the MEANS of riches;
and though avarice will preserve a man from being necessitously poor,
it generally makes him too timorous to be wealthy.

But there is another and greater distinction, for which no truly natural
or religious reason can be assigned, and that is, the distinction of men
into KINGS and SUBJECTS.  Male and female are the distinctions of nature,
good and bad the distinctions of heaven; but how a race of men came into
the world so exalted above the rest, and distinguished like some new species,
is worth inquiring into, and whether they are the means of happiness
or of misery to mankind.

In the early ages of the world, according to the scripture chronology,
there were no kings; the consequence of which was, there were no wars;
it is the pride of kings which throw mankind into confusion.  Holland
without a king hath enjoyed more peace for this last century than any
of the  monarchial governments in Europe.  Antiquity favours the same
remark; for the quiet and rural lives of the first patriarchs hath
a happy something in them, which vanishes away when we come to the
history of Jewish royalty.

Government by kings was first introduced into the world by the
Heathens, from whom the children of Israel copied the custom.