falsehoods, I will give, since he has not, some account of the
circumstances which preceded that transaction. They will serve to show
that less mischief could scarcely have accompanied such an event
when considered with the treacherous and hostile aggravations of the
enemies of the Revolution.

  The mind can hardly picture to itself a more tremendous scene than
what the city of Paris exhibited at the time of taking the Bastille,
and for two days before and after, nor perceive the possibility of its
quieting so soon. At a distance this transaction has appeared only
as an act of heroism standing on itself, and the close political
connection it had with the Revolution is lost in the brilliancy of the
achievement. But we are to consider it as the strength of the
parties brought man to man, and contending for the issue. The Bastille
was to be either the prize or the prison of the assailants. The
downfall of it included the idea of the downfall of despotism, and
this compounded image was become as figuratively united as Bunyan's
Doubting Castle and Giant Despair.

  The National Assembly, before and at the time of taking the
Bastille, was sitting at Versailles, twelve miles distant from
Paris. About a week before the rising of the Partisans, and their
taking the Bastille, it was discovered that a plot was forming, at the
head of which was the Count D'Artois, the king's youngest brother, for
demolishing the National Assembly, seizing its members, and thereby
crushing, by a coup de main, all hopes and prospects of forming a free
government. For the sake of humanity, as well as freedom, it is well
this plan did not succeed. Examples are. not wanting to show how
dreadfully vindictive and cruel are all old governments, when they are
successful against what they call a revolt.

  This plan must have been some time in contemplation; because, in
order to carry it into execution, it was necessary to collect a
large military force round Paris, and cut off the communication
between that city and the National Assembly at Versailles. The
troops destined for this service were chiefly the foreign troops in
the pay of France, and who, for this particular purpose, were drawn
from the distant provinces where they were then stationed. When they
were collected to the amount of between twenty-five and thirty
thousand, it was judged time to put the plan into execution. The
ministry who were then in office, and who were friendly to the
Revolution, were instantly dismissed and a new ministry formed of
those who had concerted the project, among whom was Count de
Broglio, and to his share was given the command of those troops. The
character of this man as described to me in a letter which I
communicated to Mr. Burke before he began to write his book, and
from an authority which Mr. Burke well knows was good, was that of
"a high-flying aristocrat, cool, and capable of every mischief."

  While these matters were agitating, the National Assembly stood in
the most perilous and critical situation that a body of men can be
supposed to act in. They were the devoted victims, and they knew it.
They had the hearts and wishes of their country on their side, but
military authority they had none. The guards of Broglio surrounded the
hall where the Assembly sat, ready, at the word of command, to seize
their persons, as had been done the year before to the Parliament of
Paris. Had the National Assembly deserted their trust, or had they
exhibited signs of weakness or fear, their enemies had been encouraged
and their country depressed. When the situation they stood in, the
cause they were engaged in, and the crisis then ready to burst,
which should determine their personal and political fate and that of
their country, and probably of Europe, are taken into one view, none
but a heart callous with prejudice or corrupted by dependence can
avoid interesting itself in their success.

  The Archbishop of Vienne was at this time President of the
National Assembly- a person too old to undergo the scene that a few
days or a few hours might bring forth. A man of more activity and
bolder fortitude was necessary, and the National Assembly chose (under
the form of a Vice-President, for the Presidency still resided in
the Archbishop) M. de la Fayette; and this is the only instance of a
Vice-President being chosen. It was at the moment that this storm
was pending (July 11th) that a declaration of rights was brought
forward by M. de la Fayette, and is the same which is alluded to
earlier. It was hastily drawn up, and makes only a part of the more
extensive declaration of rights agreed upon and adopted afterwards
by the National Assembly. The particular reason for bringing it
forward at this moment (M. de la Fayette has since informed me) was
that, if the National Assembly should fall in the threatened
destruction that then surrounded it, some trace of its principles
might have the chance of surviving the wreck.

  Everything now was drawing to a crisis. The event was freedom or
slavery. On one side, an army of nearly thirty thousand men; on the
other, an unarmed body of citizens- for the citizens of Paris, on whom
the National Assembly must then immediately depend, were as unarmed
and as undisciplined as the citizens of London are now. The French
guards had given strong symptoms of their being attached to the
national cause; but their numbers were small, not a tenth part of
the force that Broglio commanded, and their officers were in the
interest of Broglio.

  Matters being now ripe for execution, the new ministry made their
appearance in office. The reader will carry in his mind that the
Bastille was taken the 14th July; the point of time I am now
speaking of is the 12th. Immediately on the news of the change of
ministry reaching Paris, in the afternoon, all the playhouses and
places of entertainment, shops and houses, were shut up. The change of
ministry was considered as the prelude of hostilities, and the opinion
was rightly founded.