_experiences_must_themselves_be_experienced_relations,_
_and_any_kind_of_relation_experienced_must_
_be_accounted_as_'real'_as_anything_else_in_the_
_system.  Elements may indeed be redistributed,
the original placing of things getting corrected,
but a real place must be found for every kind
of thing experienced, whether term or relation,
in the final philosophic arrangement.

     Now, ordinary empiricism, in spite of the
fact that conjunctive and disjunctive relations

43
present themselves as being fully co-ordinate
parts of experience, has always shown a tendency
to do away with the connections of
things, and to insist most on the disjunctions.
Berkeley's nominalism, Hume's statement that
whatever things we distinguish are as 'loose
and separate' as if they had 'no manner of connection.'
James Mill's denial that similars have
anything 'really' in common, the resolution
of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John
Mill's account of both physical things and
selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities,
and the general pulverization of all Experience
by association and the mind-dust
theory, are examples of what I mean.

     The natural result of such a world-picture
has been the efforts of rationalism to correct
its incoherencies by the addition of trans-
experiential agents of unification, substances,
intellectual categories and powers, or Selves;

44
whereas, if empiricism had only been radical
and taken everything that comes without disfavor,
conjunction as well as separation, each
at its face value, the results would have called
for no such artificial correction.  _Radical_empiricism,_
as I understand it, _does_full_justice_to_
_conjunctive_relations_, without, however, treating
them as rationalism always tends to treat
them, as being true in some supernal way, as if
the unity of things and their variety belonged
to different orders of truth and vitality altogether.

                    II. CONJUNCTIVE RELATIONS

     Relations are of different degrees of intimacy.
Merely to be 'with' one another in a
universe of discourse is the most external relation
that terms can have, and seems to involve
nothing whatever as to farther consequences.
Simultaneity and time-interval come next, and
then space-adjacency and distance.  After
them, similarity and difference, carrying the
possibility of many inferences.  Then relations
of activity, tying terms into series involving

45
change, tendency, resistance, and the causal
order generally.  Finally, the relation experienced
between terms that form states of mind,
and are immediately conscious of continuing
each other.  The organization of the Self as a
system of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfilments
or disappointments, is incidental to
this most intimate of all relations, the terms
of which seem in many cases actually to compenetrate
and suffuse each other's being.

     Philosophy has always turned on grammatical
particles.  With, near, next, like, from,
towards, against, because, for, through, my --
these words designate types of conjunctive
relation arranged in a roughly ascending order
of intimacy and inclusiveness.  _A_priori, we can
imagine a universe of withness but no nextness;
or one of nextness but no likeness, or of likeness
with no activity, or of activity with no purpose,
or of purpose with no ego.  These would
be universes, each with its own grade of unity.
The universe of human experience is, by one or
another of its parts, of each and all these grades.

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Whether or not it possibly enjoys some still
more absolute grade of union does not appear
upon the surface.

     Taken as it does appear, our universe is to a
large extent chaotic.  No one single type of connection
runs through all the experiences that
compose it.  If we take space-relations, they
fail to connect minds into any regular system.
Causes and purposes obtain only among special
series of facts.  The self-relation seems
extremely limited and does not link two different