would be incompatible with the limits
of this essay.91)  I have just treated of type 1, the

---

   1 For brevity's sake I altogether omit mention of the type
constituted by knowledge of the truth of general propositions.  This
type has been thoroughly and, so far as I can see, satisfactorily,
elucidated in Dewey's _Studies_in_Logical_Theory_.  Such propositions
are reducible to the S-is-P form; and the 'terminus' that verifies and
fulfils is the SP in combination.  Of course percepts may be involved in
the mediating experiences, or in the 'satisfactoriness' of the P in its
new position.
---

54
kind of knowledge called perception.  This is
the type of case in which the mind enjoys direct
'acquaintance' with a present object.  In
the other types the mind has 'knowledge-
about' an object not immediately there.  Of
type 2, the simplest sort of conceptual knowledge,
I have given some account in two
articles.(1)  Type 3 can always formally
and hypothetically be reduced to type 2, so
that a brief description of that type will put
the present reader sufficiently at my point
of view, and make him see what the actual
meanings of the mysterious cognitive relation
may be.

     Suppose me to be sitting here in my library

---

   1  These articles and their doctrine, unnoticed apparently by any one
else, have lately gained favorable comment from Professor Strong.  Dr.
Dickinson S. Miller has independently thought out the same results,
which Strong accordingly dubs the James-Miller theory of cognition.
---
55
at Cambridge, at ten minutes' walk from
'Memorial Hall,' and to be thinking truly of
the latter object.  My mind may have before
it only the name, or it may have a clear image,
or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but
such intrinsic differences in the image make no
difference in its cognitive function.  Certain
_extrinsic_ phenomena, special experiences of
conjunction, are what impart to the image, be
it what it may, its knowing office.

     For instance, if you ask me what hall I mean
by my image, and I call tell you nothing; or if I
fail to point or lead you towards the Harvard
Delta; or if, being led by you, I am uncertain
whether the Hall I see be what I had in mind
or not; you would rightly deny that I had
'meant' that particular hall at all, even though
my mental image might to some degree have
resembled it.  The resemblance would count in
that case as coincidental merely, for all sorts
of things of a kind resemble one another in this
world without being held for that reason to
take cognizance of one another.

     On the other hand, if I can lead you to the

56
hall, and tell you of its history and present
uses; if in its presence I feel my idea, however
imperfect it may have been, to have led hither
and to be now _terminated_; if the associates of
the image and of the felt hall run parallel, so
that each term of the one context corresponds
serially, as I walk, with an answering term of
the others; why then my soul was prophetic,
and my idea must be, and by common consent
would be, called cognizant of reality.  That percept
was what I _meant_, for into it my idea has
passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness
and fulfilled intention.  Nowhere is there jar,
but every later moment continues and corroborates
an earlier one.

     In this continuing and corroborating, taken
in no transcendental sense, but denoting definitely
felt transitions, _lies_all_that_the_knowing_
_of_a_percept_by_an_idea_can_possibly_contain_or_
_signify_.  Wherever such transitions are felt, the
first experience _knows_ that last one.  Where they
do not, or where even as possibles they can not,
intervene, there can be no pretence of knowing.
In this latter case the extremes will be connected,

57
if connected at all, by inferior relations
-- bare likeness or succession, or by 'withness'
alone.  Knowledge of sensible realities thus
comes to life inside the tissue of experience.  It