is _made_; and made by relations that unroll
themselves in time.  Whenever certain intermediaries
are given, such that, as they develop
towards their terminus, there is experience
from point to point of one direction followed,
and finally of one process fulfilled, the result
is that _their_starting-point_thereby_becomes_a_
_knower_and_their_terminus_an_object_meant_or_
_known_.  That is all that knowing (in the simple
case considered) can be known-as, that is
the whole of its nature, put into experiential
terms.  Whenever such is the sequence of our
experiences we may freely say that we had the
terminal object 'in mind' from the outset, even
although _at_ the outset nothing was there in us
but a flat piece of substantive experience like
any other, with no self-transcendency about it,
and ny mystery save the mystery of coming
into existence and of being gradually followed
by other pieces of substantive experience, with

58
conjunctively transitional experiences between.
That is what we _mean_ here by the object's
being 'in mind.'  Of any deeper more real way
of being in mind we have no positive conception,
and we have no right to discredit our
actual experience by talking of such a way
at all.

     I know that many a reader will rebel at this.
"Mere intermediaries," he will say, "even
though they be feelings of continuously growing
fulfilment, only _separate_ the knower from
the known, whereas what we have in knowledge
is a kind of immediate touch of the one by the
other, an 'apprehension' in the etymological
sense of the word, a leaping of the chasm as by
lightning, an act by which two terms are smitten
into one, over the head of their distinctness.
All these dead intermediaries of yours
are out of each other, and outside of their
termini still."

     But do not such dialectic difficulties remind
us of the dog dropping his bone and snapping
at its image in the water?  If we knew any more
real kind of union _aliunde_, we might be entitled

59
to brand all our empirical unions as a sham.
But unions by continuous transition are the
only ones we know of, whether in this matter
of a knowledge-about that terminates in an
acquaintance, whether in personal identity, in
logical predication through the copula 'is,' or
elsewhere.  If anywhere there were more absolute
unions realized, they could only reveal
themselves to us by just such conjunctive
results.  These are what the unions are _worth_,
these are all that _we_can_ever_practically_mean_
by union, by continuity.  Is it not time to
repeat what Lotze said of substances, that to
_act_like_ one is to _be_ one?  Should we not say
here that to be experienced as continuous is to
be really continuous, in a world where experience
and reality come to the same thing?  In
a picture gallery a painted hook will serve to
hang a painted chain by, a painted cable will
hold a painted ship.  In a world where both the
terms and their distinctions are affairs of experience,
conjunctions that are experienced
must be at least as real as anything else.  They

60
will be 'absolutely' real conjunctions, if we have
no transphenomenal Absolute ready, to derealize
the whole experienced world by, at a stroke.
If, on the other hand, we had such an Absolute,
not one of our opponents' theories of knowledge
could remain standing any better than
ours could; for the distinctions as well as the
conjunctions of experience would impartially
fall its prey.  The whole question of how 'one'
thing can know 'another' would cease to be a
real one at all in a world where otherness itself
was an illusion.(1)

     So much for the essentials of the cognitive
relation, where the knowledge is conceptual in
type, or forms knowledge 'about' an object.  It
consists in intermediary experiences (possible,
if not actual) of continuously developing progress,
and, finally, of fulfilment, when the sensible
percept, which is the object, is reached.
The percept here not only _verifies_ the concept,
proves its function of knowing that percept to

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