_are_ the physical realities which those words
designate.  In this case there is no self-transcendency
implied in the knowing.  Humanism,
here, is only a more comminuted _Identitasphilosophie_.(1)

     In case (1), on the contrary, the representative
experience does transcend itself in knowing
the other experience that is its object.  No
one can talk of the knowledge of the one by the
other without seeing them as numerically distinct
entities, of which the one lies beyond the
other and away from it, along some direction
---

   1 [Cf. above, p. 134; and below, p.202.]
198
and with some interval, that can be definitely
named.  But, if the talker be a humanist, he
must also see this distance-interval concretely
and pragmatically, and confess it to consist
of other intervening experiences -- of possible
ones, at all events, if not of actual.  To call my
present idea of my dog, for example, cognitive
of the real dog means that, as the actual tissue
of experience is constituted, the idea is capable
of leading into a chain of other experiences
on my part that go from next to next and
terminate at last in vivid sense-perceptions
of a jumping, barking, hairy body.  Those _are_
the real dog, the dog's full presence, for my
common sense.  If the supposed talker is a
profound philosopher, although they may not
_be_ the real dog for him, they _mean_ the real dog,
are practical substitutes for the real dog, as
the representation was a practical substitute
for them, that real dog being a lot of atoms,
say, or of mind-stuff, that lie _where_ the sense-
perceptions lie in his experience as well as in
my own.

199

                         III

     The philosopher here stands for the stage of
thought that goes beyond the stage of common
sense; and the difference is simply that he
'interpolates' and 'extrapolates,' where common
sense does not.  For common sense, two
men see the same identical real dog.  Philosophy,
noting actual differences in their perceptions,
points out the duality of these latter,
and interpolates something between them as
a more real terminus -- first, organs, viscera,
etc.; next, cells; then, ultimate atoms; lastly,
mind-stuff perhaps.  The original sense-termini
of the two men, instead of coalescing with
each other and with the real dog-object, as at
first supposed, are thus help by philosophers to
be separated by invisible realities with which
at most, they are conterminous.

     Abolish, now, one of the percipients, and
the interpolation changes into 'extrapolation.'
The sense-terminus of the remaining percipient
is regarded by the philosopher as not quite
reaching reality.  He has only carried the procession
of experiences, the philosopher thinks,

200
to a definite, because practical, halting-place
somewhere on the way towards an absolute
truth that lies beyond.

     The humanist sees all the time, however,
that there is no absolute transcendency even
about the more absolute realities thus conjectured
or believed in.  The viscera and cells
are only possible percepts following upon that
of the outer body. The atoms again, though
we may never attain to human means of perceiving
them, are still defined perceptually.
The mind-stuff itself is conceived as a kind
of experience; and it is possible to frame the
hypothesis (such hypotheses can by no logic
be excluded from philosophy) of two knowers
of a piece of mind-stuff and the mind-stuff
itself becoming 'confluent' at the moment at
which our imperfect knowing might pass into
knowing of a completed type.  Even so do you
and I habitually represent our two perceptions
and the real dog as confluent, though only provisionally,
and for the common-sense stage
of thought.  If my pen be inwardly made of
mind-stuff, there is no confluence _now_ between

201
that mind-stuff and my visual perception of
the pen.  But conceivably there might come to
be such confluence; for, in the case of my hand,