2 Here as elsewhere the relations are of course _experienced_
relations, members of the same originally chaotic manifold of non-
perceptual experience of which the related terms themselves are
parts.
---

17
have objectivity as well as subjectivity will
probably be due to the intrusion into his mind
of _percepts_, that third group of associates with
which the non-perceptual experiences have relations,
and which, as a whole, they 'represent,'
standing to them as thoughts to things.  This
important function of non-perceptual experiences
complicates the question and confuses
it; for, so used are we to treat percepts as
the sole genuine realities that, unless we keep
them out of the discussion, we tend altogether
to overlook the objectivity that lies in non-
perceptual experiences by themselves.  We
treat them, 'knowing' percepts as they do, as
through and through subjective, and say that
they are wholly constituted of the stuff called
consciousness, using this term now for a kind
of entity, after the fashion which I am seeking
to refute.(1)

     Abstracting, then, from percepts altogether,
what I maintain is, that any single non-perceptual

---

   1 Of the representative functions of non-perceptual experience as a
whole, I will say a word in a subsequent article; it leads too far into
the general theory of knowledge for much to be said about it in a short
paper like this.
---

18
experience tends to get counted twice
over, just as a perceptual experience does, figuring
in one context as an object or field of objects,
in another as a state of mind:  and all this
without the least internal self-diremption on its
own part into consciousness and content.  It is
all consciousness in one taking; and, in the
other, all content.

     I find this objectivity of non-perceptual experiences,
this complete parallelism in point of
reality between the presently felt and the remotely
thought, so well set forth in a page of
Munsterberg's _Grundzuge_, that I will quote it
as it stands.

     "I may only think of my objects," says Professor
Munsterberg; "yet, in my living thought
they stand before me exactly as perceived objects
would do, no matter how different the two
ways of apprehending them may be in their
genesis.  The book here lying on the table before
me, and the book in the next room of which I
think and which I mean to get, are both in the
same sense given realities for me, realities
which I acknowledge and of which I take account.

19
If you agree that the perceptual object
is not an idea within me, but that percept and
thing, as indistinguishably one, are really experienced
_there_, _outside_, you ought not to believe
that the merely thought-of object is hid away
inside of the thinking subject.  The object of
which I think, and of whose existence I take
cognizance without letting it now work upon
my senses, occupies its definite place in the
outer world as much as does the object which I
directly see."

     "What is true of the here and the there, is
also true of the now and the then.  I know of
the thing which is present and perceived, but I
know also of the thing which yesterday was
but is no more, and which I only remember.
Both can determine my present conduct, both
are parts of the reality of which I keep account.
It is true that of much of the past I am uncertain,
just as I am uncertain of much of what
is present if it be but dimly perceived.  But the
interval of time does not in principle alter my
relation to the object, does not transform it
from an object known into a mental state....

20
The things in the room here which I survey,
and those in my distant home of which I think,
the things of this minute and those of my long-
vanished boyhood, influence and decide me
alike, with a reality which my experience of