them directly feels.  They both make up my
real world, they make it directly, they do not
have first to be introduced to me and mediated
by ideas which now and here arise
within me....  This not-me character
of my recollections and expectations does not
imply that the external objects of which I am
aware in those experiences should necessarily
be there also for others.  The objects of dreamers
and hallucinated persons are wholly without
general validity.  But even were they centaurs
and golden mountains, they still would
be 'off there,' in fairy land, and not 'inside' of
ourselves."(1)

     This certainly is the immediate, primary,
naif, or practical way of taking our thought-of
world.  Were there no perceptual world to
serve as its 'reductive,' in Taine's sense, by

---

   1 Munsterberg: _Grundzuge_der_Psychologie_, vol. I, p. 48.
---

21
being 'stronger' and more genuinely 'outer'
(so that the whole merely thought-of world
seems weak and inner in comparison), our
world of thought would be the only world, and
would enjoy complete reality in our belief.
This actually happens in our dreams, and in
our day-dreams so long as percepts do not
interrupt them.

     And yet, just as the seen room (to go back to
our late example) is _also_ a field of consciousness,
so the conceived or recollected room is
_also_ a state of mind; and the doubling-up of the
experience has in both cases similar grounds.

     The room thought-of, namely, has many
thought-of couplings with many thought-of
things.  Some of these couplings are inconstant,
others are stable.  In the reader's personal history
the room occupies a single date -- he saw
it only once perhaps, a year ago.  Of the house's
history, on the other hand, it forms a permanent
ingredient.  Some couplings have the curious
stubbornness, to borrow Royce's term, of
fact; others show the fluidity of fancy -- we let
them come and go as we please.  Grouped with

22
the rest of its house, with the name of its town,
of its owner, builder, value, decorative plan,
the room maintains a definite foothold, to
which, if we try to loosen it, it tends to return
and to reassert itself with force.(1)  With these
associates, in a word, it coheres, while to other
houses, other towns, other owners, etc., it shows
no tendency to cohere at all.  The two collections,
first of its cohesive, and, second, of its
loose associates, inevitably come to be contrasted.
We call the first collection the system
of external realities, in the midst of which the
room, as 'real,' exists; the other we call the
stream of internal thinking, in which, as a
'mental image,' it for a moment floats.(2)  The
room thus again gets counted twice over.  It
plays two different roles, being _Gedanke_ and
_Gedachtes_, the thought-of-an-object, and the
object-thought-of, both in one; and all this
without paradox or mystery, just as the same

---

   1 Cf. A.L. Hodder:  _The_Adversaries_of_the_Sceptic_, pp.94-99.

   2 For simplicity's sake I confine my exposition to 'external'
reality.  But there is also the system of ideal reality in which the
room plays its part.  Relations of comparison, of classification,
serial order, value, also are stubborn, assign a definite place to the
room, unlike the incoherence of its places in the mere rhapsody of our
successive thoughts.
---

23
material thing may be both low and high, or
small and great, or bad and good, because of its
relations to opposite parts of an environing
world.

     As 'subjective' we say that the experience
represents; as 'objective' it is represented.
What represents and what is represented is here
numerically the same; but we must remember
that no dualism of being represented and representing
resides in the experience _per_se_.  In
its pure state, or when isolated, there is no self-