1898

                                 THE MONADOLOGY

                          by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

                           translated by Robert Latta

  1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a
simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 'simple' is meant
'without parts.' (Theod. 10.)

  2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds;
for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple
things.

  3. Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension
nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real atoms of
nature and, in a word, the elements of things.

  4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is
no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by
natural means. (Theod. 89.)

  5. For the same reason there is no conceivable way in which a simple
substance can come into being by natural means, since it cannot be
formed by the combination of parts [composition].

  6. Thus it may be said that a Monad can only come into being or come
to an end all at once; that is to say, it can come into being only
by creation and come to an end only by annihilation, while that
which is compound comes into being or comes to an end by parts.

  7. Further, there is no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered
in quality or internally changed by any other created thing; since
it is impossible to change the place of anything in it or to
conceive in it any internal motion which could be produced,
directed, increased or diminished therein, although all this is
possible in the case of compounds, in which there are changes among
the parts. The Monads have no windows, through which anything could
come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from
substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species'
of the Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident can
come into a Monad from outside.

  8. Yet the Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not
even be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ in
quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any change
in things. For what is in the compound can come only from the simple
elements it contains, and the Monads, if they had no qualities,
would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not
differ in quantity. Consequently, space being a plenum, each part of
space would always receive, in any motion, exactly the equivalent of
what it already had, and no one state of things would be discernible
from another.

  9. Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in
nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in
which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a
difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].

  10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and
consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that
this change is continuous in each.

  11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural
changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an
external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. (Theod.
396, 400.)

  12. But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a
particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which
constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the
simple substances.

  13. This particular series of changes should involve a
multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in that which is simple. For, as
every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and
something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance
must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.

  14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a
multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is
nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished
from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this
matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as
non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously
aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone
are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other
Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish
between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made
them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely
separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in
the opinion that souls are mortal.

  15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change
or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It
is true that desire [l'appetit] cannot always fully attain to the
whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it
and attains to new perceptions.