existence, but nothing would even be possible. (Theod. 20.)

  44. For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or
rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in
something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of
the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to
be possible is to be actual. (Theod. 184-189, 335.)

  45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative
that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing
can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits,
no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His
possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of
God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal
truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since
there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or
sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of
its existence in itself.

  46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal
truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His
will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held.
That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is
fitness [convenance] or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths
depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. (Theod.
180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)

  47. Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple
substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products
and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of
the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of
the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (Theod.
382-391, 398, 395.)

  48. In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also
Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally
Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of
the best. (Theod. 7, 149, 150.) These characteristics correspond to
what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty
of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. But in God these
attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the created
Monads or the Entelechies (or perfectihabiae, as Hermolaus Barbarus
translated the word) there are only imitations of these attributes,
according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. (Theod. 87.)

  49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has
perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to
another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is
attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and
passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod.
32, 66, 386.)

  50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this,
that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a
priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account
that the former is said to act upon the latter.

  51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another
is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation
of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that
God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should
have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any
physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this
means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65,
66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)

  52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities
are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each
reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently
what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of
view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to
explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in
so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to
be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)

  53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of
possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there
must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him
to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196
sqq., 225, 414-416.)

  54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance],
or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each
possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to
the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 167, 350,
201, 130, 352, 345 sqq., 354.)

  55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to
God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His
power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208.
Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)

  56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each
and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations
which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a
perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)

  57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears
quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects
[perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of