simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes,
which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single
universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.
(Theod. 147.)

  58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as
possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it
is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124,
241 sqq., 214, 243, 275.)

  59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved)
fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle
recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised
objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I
was attributing too much to God- more than it is possible to
attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the
impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every
substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has
with them.

  60. Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the
reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are.
For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in
particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can
confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it
is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the
variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and
can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely,
those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of
the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as
regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which
they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a
confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole;
but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their
distinct perceptions.

  61. And compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent
avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum (and thus all matter is
connected together) and in the plenum every motion has an effect
upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body
not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some
way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is
mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is
in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this
inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however
great. And consequently every body feels the effect of all that
takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in
each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall
happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time
as in place: sympnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can
read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it
cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its
complexity is infinite.

  62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe,
it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it,
and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole
universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul
also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which
belongs to it in a special way. (Theod. 400.)

  63. The body belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its
soul) constitutes along with the entelechy what may be called a living
being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. Now this body
of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad
is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is
ruled according to a perfect order, there must also be order in that
which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and
consequently there must be order in the body, through which the
universe is represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)

  64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine
machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all
artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a
machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel
has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and
which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they
give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But
the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in
their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the
difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the
divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.)

  65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and
infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is
not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also
actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of
which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be
impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe.
(Theod. Prelim., Disc. de la Conform. 70, and 195.)

  66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter
there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies,
souls.

  67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of
plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant,
each member of every animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also
some such garden or pond.