68. And though the earth and the air which are between the plants of
the garden, or the water which is between the fish of the pond, be
neither plant nor fish; yet they also contain plants and fishes, but
mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us.

  69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in
the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as
it might appear to be in a pond at a distance, in which one would
see a confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the
pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. (Theod.
Pref. [E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44].)

  70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy,
which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body
are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has
also its dominant entelechy or soul.

  71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some who have
misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a quantity or portion
of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it for
ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings,
which are devoted for ever to its service. For all bodies are in a
perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and
passing out of them continually.

  72. Thus the soul changes its body only by degrees, little by
little, so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs;
and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never
metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; nor are there souls
entirely separate [from bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans
corps]. God alone is completely without body. (Theod. 90, 124.)

  73. It also follows from this that there never is absolute birth
[generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in
the separation of the soul from the body. What we call births
[generations] are developments and growths, while what we call
deaths are envelopments and diminutions.

  74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms,
entelechies, or souls; but nowadays it has become known, through
careful studies of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic
bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction, but
always come from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some
preformation; and it is held that not only the organic body was
already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in
short, the animal itself; and that by means of conception this
animal has merely been prepared for the great transformation
involved in its becoming an animal of another kind. Something like
this is indeed seen apart from birth [generation], as when worms
become flies and caterpillars become butterflies. (Theod. 86, 89.
Pref. [E. 475 b; G. vi. 40 sqq.]; 90, 187, 188, 403, 86, 397.)

  75. The animals, of which some are raised by means of conception
to the rank of larger animals, may be called spermatic, but those
among them which are not so raised but remain in their own kind
(that is, the majority) are born, multiply, and are destroyed like the
large animals, and it is only a few chosen ones [elus] that pass to
a greater theatre.

  76. But this is only half of the truth, and accordingly I hold
that if an animal never comes into being by natural means
[naturellement], no more does it come to an end by natural means;
and that not only will there be no birth [generation], but also no
complete destruction or death in the strict sense. And these
reasonings, made a posteriori and drawn from experience are in perfect
agreement with my principles deduced a priori, as above. (Theod. 90.)

  77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an
indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal
itself, though its mechanism [machine] may often perish in part and
take off or put on an organic slough [des depouilles organiques].

  78. These principles have given me a way of explaining naturally the
union or rather the mutual agreement [conformite] of the soul and
the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise
follows its own laws; and they agree with each other in virtue of
the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all
representations of one and the same universe. (Pref. [E. 475 a; G. vi.
39]; Theod. 340, 352, 353, 358.)

  79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes through
appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of
efficient causes or motions. And the two realms, that of efficient
causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with one another.

  80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to
bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in
matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change
the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not
known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the
conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes
noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established
harmony. (Pref. [E. 477 a; G. vi. 44]; Theod. 22, 59, 60, 61, 63,
66, 345, 346 sqq., 354, 355.)

  81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the
impossible) there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no
bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other.

  82. As regards minds [esprits] or rational souls, though I find that