subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm,
was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the
impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect
to something of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an
example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately
following the Reformation; another, though limited to the Continent
and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the
latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer
duration, in the intellectual fermentation of Germany during the
Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the
particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that
during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In each, an old
mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its
place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what
it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in
the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one
or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all
three impulses are well nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start
until we again assert our mental freedom.

  Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and
dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be
false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of
the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is
not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who
has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be
false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it
may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it
will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

  There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as
formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what
they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of
the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the
most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get
their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and
some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their
influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received
opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still
be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely
is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded
on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an
argument. Waiving, however, this possibility- assuming that the true
opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief
independent of, and proof against, argument- this is not the way in
which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not
knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more,
accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

  If the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated, a
thing which Protestants at least do not deny, on what can these
faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one, than on the
things which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for
him to hold opinions on them? If the cultivation of the
understanding consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely
in learning the grounds of one's own opinions. Whatever people
believe, on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe
rightly, they ought to be able to defend against at least the common
objections. But, some one may say, "Let them be taught the grounds
of their opinions. It does not follow that opinions must be merely
parroted because they are never heard controverted. Persons who
learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory, but
understand and learn likewise the demonstrations; and it would be
absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of
geometrical truths, because they never hear any one deny, and
attempt to disprove them." Undoubtedly: and such teaching suffices
on a subject like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be
said on the wrong side of the question. The peculiarity of the
evidence of mathematical truths is that all the argument is on one
side. There are no objections, and no answers to objections. But on
every subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth
depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting
reasons. Even in natural philosophy, there is always some other
explanation possible of the same facts; some geocentric theory instead
of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen; and it has to be
shown why that other theory cannot be the true one: and until this
is shown, and until we know how it is shown, we do not understand
the grounds of our opinion.

  But when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals,
religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life,
three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in
dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from
it. The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record
that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not
still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as
the means of forensic success requires to be imitated by all who study
any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own
side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and
no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally
unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so
much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either
opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of
judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led
by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to
which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should
hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented
as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations.
That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into
real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from