given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of
government cannot be pronounced on by any sweeping rule. Knowledge
of the particular people, and general practical judgment and sagacity,
must be the guides.

  There is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A
people may be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle a desire
for them is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend and
advocate a particular institution or form of government, and set its
advantages in the strongest light, is one of the modes, often the only
mode within reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for
accepting or claiming, but also for working, the institution. What
means had Italian patriots, during the last and present generation, of
preparing the Italian people for freedom in unity, but by inciting
them to demand it? Those, however, who undertake such a task, need
to be duly impressed, not solely with the benefits of the
institution or polity which they recommend, but also with the
capacities, moral, intellectual, and active, required for working
it; that they may avoid, if possible, stirring up a desire too much in
advance of the capacity.

  The result of what has been said is, that, within the limits set
by the three conditions so often adverted to, institutions and forms
of government are a matter of choice. To inquire into the best form of
government in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical,
but a highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to
introduce into any country the best institutions which, in the
existing state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable
degree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational objects
to which practical effort can address itself. Everything which can
be said by way of disparaging the efficacy of human will and purpose
in matters of government might be said of it in every other of its
applications. In all things there are very strict limits to human
power. It can only act by wielding some one or more of the forces of
nature. Forces, therefore, that can be applied to the desired use must
exist; and will only act according to their own laws. We cannot make
the river run backwards; but we do not therefore say that watermills
"are not made, but grow." In politics, as in mechanics, the power
which is to keep the engine going must be sought for outside the
machinery; and if it is not forthcoming, or is insufficient to
surmount the obstacles which may reasonably be expected, the
contrivance will fail. This is no peculiarity of the political art;
and amounts only to saying that it is subject to the same
limitations and conditions as all other arts.

  At this point we are met by another objection, or the same objection
in a different form. The forces, it is contended, on which the greater
political phenomena depend, are not amenable to the direction of
politicians or philosophers. The government of a country, it is
affirmed, is, in all substantial respects, fixed and determined
beforehand by the state of the country in regard to the distribution
of the elements of social power. Whatever is the strongest power in
society will obtain the governing authority; and a change in the
political constitution cannot be durable unless preceded or
accompanied by an altered distribution of power in society itself. A
nation, therefore, cannot choose its form of government. The mere
details, and practical organisation, it may choose; but the essence of
the whole, the seat of the supreme power, is determined for it by
social circumstances.

  That there is a portion of truth in this doctrine I at once admit;
but to make it of any use, it must be reduced to a distinct expression
and proper limits. When it is said that the strongest power in society
will make itself strongest in the government, what is meant by
power? Not thews and sinews; otherwise pure democracy would be the
only form of polity that could exist. To mere muscular strength, add
two other elements, property and intelligence, and we are nearer the
truth, but far from having yet reached it. Not only is a greater
number often kept down by a less, but the greater number may have a
preponderance in property, and individually in intelligence, and may
yet be held in subjection, forcibly or otherwise, by a minority in
both respects inferior to it. To make these various elements of
power politically influential they must be organised; and the
advantage in organisation is necessarily with those who are in
possession of the government. A much weaker party in all other
elements of power may greatly preponderate when the powers of
government are thrown into the scale; and may long retain its
predominance through this alone: though, no doubt, a government so
situated is in the condition called in mechanics unstable equilibrium,
like a thing balanced on its smaller end, which, if once disturbed,
tends more and more to depart from, instead of reverting to, its
previous state.

  But there are still stronger objections to this theory of government
in the terms in which it is usually stated. The power in society which
has any tendency to convert itself into political power is not power
quiescent, power merely passive, but active power; in other words,
power actually exerted; that is to say, a very small portion of all
the power in existence. Politically speaking, a great part of all
power consists in will. How is it possible, then, to compute the
elements of political power, while we omit from the computation
anything which acts on the will? To think that because those who wield
the power in society wield in the end that of government, therefore it
is of no use to attempt to influence the constitution of the
government by acting on opinion, is to forget that opinion is itself
one of the greatest active social forces. One person with a belief
is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests. They
who can succeed in creating a general persuasion that a certain form
of government, or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred,
have made nearly the most important step which can possibly be taken