patronage, for the reward of adherents, or to buy off those who
would otherwise be opponents, which are always stronger, with
statesmen of average honesty, than a conscientious sense of the duty
of appointing the fittest man. To put this one class of appointments
as far as possible out of harm's way is of more consequence than the
worst which can happen to all other offices in the state; for, in
every other department, if the officer is unqualified, the general
opinion of the community directs him in a certain degree what to do:
but in the position of the administrators of a dependency where the
people are not fit to have the control in their own hands, the
character of the government entirely depends on the qualifications,
moral and intellectual, of the individual functionaries.

  It cannot be too often repeated, that in a country like India
everything depends on the personal qualities and capacities of the
agents of government. This truth is the cardinal principle of Indian
administration. The day when it comes to be thought that the
appointment of persons to situations of trust from motives of
convenience, already so criminal in England, can be practised with
impunity in India, will be the beginning of the decline and fall of
our empire there. Even with a sincere intention of preferring the best
candidate, it will not do to rely on chance for supplying fit persons.
The system must be calculated to form them. It has done this hitherto;
and because it has done so, our rule in India has lasted, and been one
of constant, if not very rapid, improvement in prosperity and good
administration. As much bitterness is now manifested against this
system, and as much eagerness displayed to overthrow it, as if
educating and training the officers of government for their work
were a thing utterly unreasonable and indefensible, an unjustifiable
interference with the rights of ignorance and inexperience. There is a
tacit conspiracy between those who would like to job in first-rate
Indian offices for their connections here, and those who, being
already in India, claim to be promoted from the indigo factory or
the attorney's office, to administer justice or fix the payments due
to government from millions of people. The "monopoly" of the Civil
Service, so much inveighed against, is like the monopoly of judicial
offices by the bar; and its abolition would be like opening the
bench in Westminster Hall to the first comer whose friends certify
that he has now and then looked into Blackstone. Were the course
ever adopted of sending men from this country, or encouraging them
in going out, to get themselves put into high appointments without
having learnt their business by passing through the lower ones, the
most important offices would be thrown to Scotch cousins and
adventurers, connected by no professional feeling with the country
or the work, held to no previous knowledge, and eager only to make
money rapidly and return home.

  The safety of the country is, that those by whom it is
administered be sent out in youth, as candidates only, to begin at the
bottom of the ladder, and ascend higher or not, as, after a proper
interval, they are proved qualified. The defect of the East India
Company's system was, that though the best men were carefully sought
out for the most important posts, yet if an officer remained in the
service, promotion, though it might be delayed, came at last in some
shape or other, to the least as well as to the most competent. Even
the inferior in qualifications, among such a corps of functionaries,
consisted, it must be remembered, of men who had been brought up to
their duties, and had fulfilled them for many years, at lowest without
disgrace, under the eye and authority of a superior. But though this
diminished the evil, it was nevertheless considerable. A man who never
becomes fit for more than an assistant's duty should remain an
assistant all his life, and his juniors should be promoted over him.
With this exception, I am not aware of any real defect in the old
system of Indian appointments. It had already received the greatest
other improvement it was susceptible of, the choice of the original
candidates by competitive examination: which, besides the advantage of
recruiting from a higher grade of industry and capacity, has the
recommendation, that under it, unless by accident, there are no
personal ties between the candidates for offices and those who have
a voice in conferring them.

  It is in no way unjust that public officers thus selected and
trained should be exclusively eligible to offices which require
specially Indian knowledge and experience. If any door to the higher
appointments, without passing through the lower, be opened even for
occasional use, there will be such incessant knocking at it by persons
of influence that it will be impossible ever to keep it closed. The
only excepted appointment should be the highest one of all. The
Viceroy of British India should be a person selected from all
Englishmen for his great general capacity for government. If he have
this, he will be able to distinguish in others, and turn to his own
use, that special knowledge and judgment in local affairs which he has
not himself had the opportunity of acquiring. There are good reasons
why (saving exceptional cases) the Viceroy should not be a member of
the regular service. All services have, more or less, their class
prejudices, from which the supreme ruler ought to be exempt. Neither
are men, however able and experienced, who have passed their lives
in Asia, so likely to possess the most advanced European ideas in
general statesmanship; which the chief ruler should carry out with
him, and blend with the results of Indian experience. Again, being
of a different class, and especially if chosen by a different
authority, he will seldom have any personal partialities to warp his
appointments to office. This great security for honest bestowal of
patronage existed in rare perfection under the mixed government of the
Crown and the East India Company. The supreme dispensers of office,
the Governor-General and Governors, were appointed, in fact though not
formally, by the Crown, that is, by the general Government, not by the
intermediate body; and a great officer of the Crown probably had not a
single personal or political connection in the local service: while
the delegated body, most of whom had themselves served in the country,