all interests extending beyond the family. She is taught that she
has no business with things out of that sphere; and accordingly she
seldom has any honest and conscientious opinion on them; and
therefore hardly ever meddles with them for any legitimate purpose,
but generally for an interested one. She neither knows nor cares
which is the right side in politics, but she knows what will bring
in money or invitations, give her husband a title, her son a place,
or her daughter a good marriage. 

But how, it will be asked, can any society exist without
government? In a family, as in a state, some one person must be the
ultimate ruler. Who shall decide when married people differ in
opinion? Both cannot have their way, yet a decision one way or the
other must be come to. 

It is not true that in all voluntary association between two
people, one of them must be absolute master: still less that the
law must determine which of them it shall be. The most frequent
case of voluntary association, next to marriage, is partnership in
business: and it is not found or thought necessary to enact that in
every partnership, one partner shall have entire control over the
concern, and the others shall be bound to obey his orders. No one
would enter into partnership on terms which would subject him to
the responsibilities of a principal, with only the powers and
privileges of a clerk or agent. If the law dealt with other
contracts as it does with marriage, it would ordain that one
partner should administer the common business as if it was his
private concern; that the others should have only delegated powers;
and that this one should be designated by some general presumption
of law, for example as being the eldest. The law never does this:
nor does experience show it to be necessary that any theoretical
inequality of power should exist between the partners, or that the
partnership should have any other conditions than what they may
themselves appoint by their articles of agreement. Yet it might
seem that the exclusive power might be conceded with less danger to
the rights and interests of the inferior, in the case of
partnership than in that of marriage, since he is free to cancel
the power by withdrawing from the connexion. The wife has no such
power, and even if she had, it is almost always desirable that she
should try all measures before resorting to it. 

It is quite true that things which have to be decided everyday, and
cannot adjust themselves gradually, or wait for a compromise, ought
to depend on one will; one person must have their sole control. But
it does not follow that this should always be the same person. The
natural arrangement is a division of powers between the two; each
being absolute in the executive branch of their own department, and
any change of system and principle requiring the consent of both.
The division neither can nor should be pre-established by the law,
since it must depend on individual capacities and suitabilities. If
the two persons chose, they might pre-appoint it by the marriage
contract, as pecuniary arrangements are now often pre-appointed.
There would seldom be any difficulty in deciding such things by
mutual consent, unless the marriage was one of those unhappy ones
in which all other things, as well as this, become subjects of
bickering and dispute. The division of rights would naturally
follow the division of duties and functions; and that is already
made by consent, or at all events not by law, but by general
custom, modified and modifiable at the pleasure of the persons
concerned. 

The real practical decision of affairs, to whichever may be given
the legal authority, will greatly depend, as it even now does, upon
comparative qualifications. The mere fact that he is usually the
eldest, will in most cases give the preponderance to the man; at
least until they both attain a time of life at which the difference
in their years is of no importance. There will naturally also be a
more potential voice on the side, whichever it is, that brings the
means of support. Inequality from this source does not depend on
the law of marriage, but on the general conditions of human
society, as now constituted. The influence of mental superiority,
either general or special, and of superior decision of character,
will necessarily tell for much. It always does so at present. And
this fact shows how little foundation there is for the apprehension
that the powers and responsibilities of partners in life (as of
partners in business), cannot be satisfactorily apportioned by
agreement between themselves. They always are so apportioned,
except in cases in which the marriage institution is a failure.
Things never come to an issue of downright power on one side, and
obedience on the other, except where the connexion altogether has
been a mistake, and it would be a blessing to both parties to be
relieved from it. Some may say that the very thing by which an
amicable settlement of differences becomes possible, is the power
of legal compulsion known to be in reserve; as people submit to an
arbitration because there is a court of law in the background,
which they know that they can be forced to obey. But to make the
cases parallel, we must suppose that the rule of the court of law
was, not to try the cause, but to give judgment always for the same
side, suppose the defendant. If so, the amenability to it would be
a motive with the plaintiff to agree to almost any arbitration, but
it would be just the reverse with the defendant. The despotic power
which the law gives to the husband may be a reason to make the wife
assent to any compromise by which power is practically shared
between the two, but it cannot be the reason why the husband does.
That there is always among decently conducted people a practical
compromise, though one of them at least is under no physical or
moral necessity of making it, shows that the natural motives which
lead to a voluntary adjustment of the united life of two persons in
a manner acceptable to both, do on the whole, excepting
unfavourable cases, prevail. The matter is certainly not improved