unjust laws, and that law, consequently, is not the ultimate criterion
of justice, but may give to one person a benefit, or impose on another
an evil, which justice condemns. When, however, a law is thought to be
unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same way
in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's
right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a
different appellation, and is called a moral right. We may say,
therefore, that a second case of injustice consists in taking or
withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.

  Thirdly, it is universally considered just that each person should
obtain that (whether good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust
that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which
he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most
emphatic form in which the idea of justice is conceived by the general
mind. As it involves the notion of desert, the question arises, what
constitutes desert? Speaking in a general way, a person is
understood to deserve good if he does right, evil if he does wrong;
and in a more particular sense, to deserve good from those to whom
he does or has done good, and evil from those to whom he does or has
done evil. The precept of returning good for evil has never been
regarded as a case of the fulfilment of justice, but as one in which
the claims of justice are waived, in obedience to other
considerations.

  Fourthly, it is confessedly unjust to break faith with any one: to
violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint
expectations raised by our conduct, at least if we have raised those
expectations knowingly and voluntarily. Like the other obligations
of justice already spoken of, this one is not regarded as absolute,
but as capable of being overruled by a stronger obligation of
justice on the other side; or by such conduct on the part of the
person concerned as is deemed to absolve us from our obligation to
him, and to constitute a forfeiture of the benefit which he has been
led to expect.

  Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to
be partial; to show favour or preference to one person over another,
in matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply.
Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in
itself, but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is
admitted that favour and preference are not always censurable, and
indeed the cases in which they are condemned are rather the
exception than the rule. A person would be more likely to be blamed
than applauded for giving his family or friends no superiority in good
offices over strangers, when he could do so without violating any
other duty; and no one thinks it unjust to seek one person in
preference to another as a friend, connection, or companion.
Impartiality where rights are concerned is of course obligatory, but
this is involved in the more general obligation of giving to every one
his right. A tribunal, for example, must be impartial, because it is
bound to award, without regard to any other consideration, a
disputed object to the one of two parties who has the right to it.
There are other cases in which impartiality means, being solely
influenced by desert; as with those who, in the capacity of judges,
preceptors, or parents, administer reward and punishment as such.
There are cases, again, in which it means, being solely influenced
by consideration for the public interest; as in making a selection
among candidates for a government employment. Impartiality, in
short, as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean, being
exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed
ought to influence the particular case in hand; and resisting the
solicitation of any motives which prompt to conduct different from
what those considerations would dictate.

  Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality is that of equality; which
often enters as a component part both into the conception of justice
and into the practice of it, and, in the eyes of many persons,
constitutes its essence. But in this, still more than in any other
case, the notion of justice varies in different persons, and always
conforms in its variations to their notion of utility. Each person
maintains that equality is the dictate of justice, except where he
thinks that expediency requires inequality. The justice of giving
equal protection to the rights of all, is maintained by those who
support the most outrageous inequality in the rights themselves.
Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted that the rights
of the slave, such as they are, ought to be as sacred as those of
the master; and that a tribunal which fails to enforce them with equal
strictness is wanting in justice; while, at the same time,
institutions which leave to the slave scarcely any rights to
enforce, are not deemed unjust, because they are not deemed
inexpedient. Those who think that utility requires distinctions of
rank, do not consider it unjust that riches and social privileges
should be unequally dispensed; but those who think this inequality
inexpedient, think it unjust also. Whoever thinks that government is
necessary, sees no injustice in as much inequality as is constituted
by giving to the magistrate powers not granted to other people. Even
among those who hold levelling doctrines, there are as many
questions of justice as there are differences of opinion about
expediency. Some Communists consider it unjust that the produce of the
labour of the community should be shared on any other principle than
that of exact equality; others think it just that those should receive
most whose wants are greatest; while others hold that those who work
harder, or who produce more, or whose services are more valuable to
the community, may justly claim a larger quota in the division of
the produce. And the sense of natural justice may be plausibly
appealed to in behalf of every one of these opinions.

  Among so many diverse applications of the term justice, which yet is
not regarded as ambiguous, it is a matter of some difficulty to