To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been
mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of
mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any
distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete
survey and criticism, of past and present ethical doctrine. It
would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or
consistency these moral beliefs have, attained, has been mainly due to
the tacit influence of a standard not recognised. Although the
non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not
so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still,
as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly
influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their
happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it,
the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the
moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its
authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit
that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even
predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however
unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of
morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further,
and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary
to argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable. It is not my
present purpose to criticise these thinkers; but I cannot help
referring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the
most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Ethics, by Kant. This
remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the
landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the
treatise in question, lay down a universal first principle as the
origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: "So act, that the
rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all
rational beings." But when he begins to deduce from this precept any
of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to
show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say
physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the
most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the
consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would
choose to incur.

  On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of
the other theories, attempt to contribute something towards the
understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory,
and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that
this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the
term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.
Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a
means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical
art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it
possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for
the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is
it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted
that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which
are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as
an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is
not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not,
however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on
blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the
word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other
of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the
cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal
with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be
presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or
withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.

  We shall examine presently of what nature are these
considerations; in what manner they apply to the case, and what
rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting
the utilitarian formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational
acceptance or rejection, that the formula should be correctly
understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed
of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and
that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions,
the question would be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of
its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into
the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the
utilitarian standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine
itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is,
distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the
practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely
connected with, mistaken interpretations of its meaning. Having thus
prepared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such
light as I can upon the question, considered as one of philosophical
theory.

                               Chapter 2

                          What Utilitarianism Is.

  A PASSING remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant
blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test
of right and wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely
colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology
is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even
the momentary appearance of confounding them with any one capable of
so absurd a misconception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch
as the contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and
that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges
against utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able
writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons,
denounce the theory "as impracticably dry when the word utility
precedes the word pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when the