Let us take first the Couplement of body and Soul. How could
suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement?

    It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces
a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges
into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation
unexplained.

    Another suggestion might be that all is due to an opinion or
judgement: some evil seems to have befallen the man or his
belongings and this conviction sets up a state of trouble in the
body and in the entire Animate. But this account leaves still a
question as to the source and seat of the judgement: does it belong to
the Soul or to the Couplement? Besides, the judgement that evil is
present does not involve the feeling of grief: the judgement might
very well arise and the grief by no means follow: one may think
oneself slighted and yet not be angry; and the appetite is not
necessarily excited by the thought of a pleasure. We are, thus, no
nearer than before to any warrant for assigning these affections to
the Couplement.

    Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a
Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty and,
collectively, that all tendency is seated in the Appetitive-Faculty?
Such a statement of the facts does not help towards making the
affections common to the Couplement; they might still be seated either
in the Soul alone or in the body alone. On the one hand if the
appetite is to be stirred, as in the carnal passion, there must be a
heating of the blood and the bile, a well-defined state of the body;
on the other hand, the impulse towards The Good cannot be a joint
affection, but, like certain others too, it would belong necessarily
to the Soul alone.

    Reason, then, does not permit us to assign all the affections to
the Couplement.

    In the case of carnal desire, it will certainly be the Man that
desires, and yet, on the other hand, there must be desire in the
Desiring-Faculty as well. How can this be? Are we to suppose that,
when the man originates the desire, the Desiring-Faculty moves to
the order? How could the Man have come to desire at all unless through
a prior activity in the Desiring-Faculty? Then it is the
Desiring-Faculty that takes the lead? Yet how, unless the body be
first in the appropriate condition?

    6. It may seem reasonable to lay down as a law that when any
powers are contained by a recipient, every action or state
expressive of them must be the action or state of that recipient, they
themselves remaining unaffected as merely furnishing efficiency.

    But if this were so, then, since the Animate is the recipient of
the Causing-Principle [i.e., the Soul] which brings life to the
Couplement, this Cause must itself remain unaffected, all the
experiences and expressive activities of the life being vested in
the recipient, the Animate.

    But this would mean that life itself belongs not to the Soul but
to the Couplement; or at least the life of the Couplement would not be
the life of the Soul; Sense-Perception would belong not to the
Sensitive-Faculty but to the container of the faculty.

    But if sensation is a movement traversing the body and culminating
in Soul, how the soul lack sensation? The very presence of the
Sensitive-Faculty must assure sensation to the Soul.

    Once again, where is Sense-Perception seated?

    In the Couplement.

    Yet how can the Couplement have sensation independently of
action in the Sensitive-Faculty, the Soul left out of count and the
Soul-Faculty?

    7. The truth lies in the Consideration that the Couplement
subsists by virtue of the Soul's presence.

    This, however, is not to say that the Soul gives itself as it is
in itself to form either the Couplement or the body.

    No; from the organized body and something else, let us say a
light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms a distinct
Principle, the Animate; and in this Principle are vested
Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to belong to
the Animate.

    But the "We"? How have We Sense-Perception?

    By the fact that We are not separate from the Animate so
constituted, even though certainly other and nobler elements go to
make up the entire many-sided nature of Man.

    The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act by the
immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning
of impressions printed upon the Animate by sensation: these
impressions are already Intelligibles while the outer sensation is a
mere phantom of the other [of that in the Soul] which is nearer to
Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-Forms.

    And by means of these Ideal-Forms, by which the Soul wields single
lordship over the Animate, we have Discursive-Reasoning,