world and Hercules himself among the gods: treating the hero as
existing in the two realms at once, he gives us a twofold Hercules.

    It is not difficult to explain this distinction. Hercules was a
hero of practical virtue. By his noble serviceableness he was worthy
to be a God. On the other hand, his merit was action and not the
Contemplation which would place him unreservedly in the higher
realm. Therefore while he has place above, something of him remains
below.

    13. And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We
or the Soul?

    We, but by the Soul.

    But how "by the Soul"? Does this mean that the Soul reasons by
possession [by contact with the matters of enquiry]?

    No; by the fact of being Soul. Its Act subsists without
movement; or any movement that can be ascribed to it must be utterly
distinct from all corporal movement and be simply the Soul's own life.

    And Intellection in us is twofold: since the Soul is intellective,
and Intellection is the highest phase of life, we have Intellection
both by the characteristic Act of our Soul and by the Act of the
Intellectual-Principle upon us- for this Intellectual-Principle is
part of us no less than the Soul, and towards it we are ever rising.

                        SECOND TRACTATE.

                           ON VIRTUE.

    1. Since Evil is here, "haunting this world by necessary law," and
it is the Soul's design to escape from Evil, we must escape hence.

    But what is this escape?

    "In attaining Likeness to God," we read. And this is explained
as "becoming just and holy, living by wisdom," the entire nature
grounded in Virtue.

    But does not Likeness by way of Virtue imply Likeness to some
being that has Virtue? To what Divine Being, then, would our
Likeness be? To the Being- must we not think?- in Which, above all,
such excellence seems to inhere, that is to the Soul of the Kosmos and
to the Principle ruling within it, the Principle endowed with a wisdom
most wonderful. What could be more fitting than that we, living in
this world, should become Like to its ruler?

    But, at the beginning, we are met by the doubt whether even in
this Divine-Being all the virtues find place- Moral-Balance
[Sophrosyne], for example; or Fortitude where there can be no danger
since nothing is alien; where there can be nothing alluring whose lack
could induce the desire of possession.

    If, indeed, that aspiration towards the Intelligible which is in
our nature exists also in this Ruling-Power, then need not look
elsewhere for the source of order and of the virtues in ourselves.

    But does this Power possess the Virtues?

    We cannot expect to find There what are called the Civic
Virtues, the Prudence which belongs to the reasoning faculty; the
Fortitude which conducts the emotional and passionate nature; the
Sophrosyne which consists in a certain pact, in a concord between
the passionate faculty and the reason; or Rectitude which is the due
application of all the other virtues as each in turn should command or
obey.

    Is Likeness, then, attained, perhaps, not by these virtues of
the social order but by those greater qualities known by the same
general name? And if so do the Civic Virtues give us no help at all?

    It is against reason, utterly to deny Likeness by these while
admitting it by the greater: tradition at least recognizes certain men
of the civic excellence as divine, and we must believe that these
too had in some sort attained Likeness: on both levels there is virtue
for us, though not the same virtue.

    Now, if it be admitted that Likeness is possible, though by a
varying use of different virtues and though the civic virtues do not
suffice, there is no reason why we should not, by virtues peculiar
to our state, attain Likeness to a model in which virtue has no place.

    But is that conceivable?

    When warmth comes in to make anything warm, must there needs be
something to warm the source of the warmth?

    If a fire is to warm something else, must there be a fire to
warm that fire?

    Against the first illustration it may be retorted that the
source of the warmth does already contain warmth, not by an infusion
but as an essential phase of its nature, so that, if the analogy is to
hold, the argument would make Virtue something communicated to the
Soul but an essential constituent of the Principle from which the Soul
attaining Likeness absorbs it.

    Against the illustration drawn from the fire, it may be urged that